The Virtuous Lawyer: Paradigm and Possibility by Araujo, Robert
SMU Law Review
Volume 50 | Issue 2 Article 2
1997
The Virtuous Lawyer: Paradigm and Possibility
Robert Araujo
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in SMU Law Review by
an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Robert Araujo, The Virtuous Lawyer: Paradigm and Possibility, 50 SMU L. Rev. 433 (1997)
https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr/vol50/iss2/2
Articles
THE VIRTUOUS LAWYER: PARADIGM
AND POSSIBILITY
Robert Araujo, S.J. *
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION ........................................ 434
II. A DIGRESSION AND AN EXCURSION DOWN THE
YELLOW BRICK ROAD ................................ 437
III. THE VIRTUES AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO
LAW AND LAWYERS ................................... 438
IV. WHY NOT RULES RATHER THAN VIRTUE? ........ 446
V. ANOTHER DIGRESSION: THREE QUESTIONS ...... 452
A. THE VIRTUOUS LAWYER DISTINGUISHES BETWEEN
THE RIGHT AND THE GOOD ........................... 452
B. WHAT IS CONSTITUTIVE OF THE VIRTUOUS LAWYER'S
LEGAL REASONING? .... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 458
C. DOES THE VIRTUOUS LAWYER ALWAYS HAVE A
DUTY TO OBEY THE LAW? ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 464
VI. THE VIRTUOUS LAWYER AT WORK: SEVERAL
PA RAD IGM S ............................................ 470
VII. SOME FINAL THOUGHTS ............................. 491
"Happy are we if we exercise justice and constantly practise
[sic] virtue!"'
"The Happiness of society is the end of government .... All
sober inquirers after truth... have declared that the happiness of
man, as well as his dignity, consists in virtue."'2
* Associate Professor of Law, Gonzaga University School of Law. A.B., J.D., Ge-
orgetown University; M. Div., S.T.L., Weston Jesuit School of Theology; LL.M., J.S.D.,
Columbia University; B.C.L., Oxford University. The author thanks Professor David K.
DeWolf for his valuable comments and Dean John Clute for his generous support.
1. Psalms 106:3 (Jerusalem).
2. John Adams, Thoughts on Government, in 4 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 193
(1776). In a contemporary context, the relevance and importance of truth to today's
lawyer is no less important than in the time of John Adams and the Founders of the
American republic. See Thomas L. Shaffer, On Lying for Clients, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REv.
195 (1996).
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I. INTRODUCTION
N the recent past, much ink has been consumed to discuss the decline
of professionalism and ethical behavior within the legal profession.3
The pages of scholarly legal periodicals as well as national and state
bar journals have presented the concerns of many who are alarmed about
the negative direction in which many members of the legal profession
appear to be taking themselves and many of their colleagues. 4 While crit-
ics of lawyers have argued well the case against them, the critics could not
have convinced their readers of the sorry state of legal professionalism if
the decline were not true. After all, one need only consider the status of
the profession in the minds of many Americans in the aftermath of a
3. Prior to this Article, I have addressed some of the issues about the relationship
between virtue, the role of judges, and the law. See Robert J. Araujo, S.J., Thomas Aqui-
nas: Prudence, Justice, and the Law, 40 Loy. L. REV. 897 (1995); Robert J. Araujo, S.J.,
Moral Issues and the Virtuous Judge: Reflections on the Nomination and Confirmation of
Supreme Court Justices-From O'Connor to Thomas, 35 CATH. LAW. 311 (1994). See gen-
erally MARY A. GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS: How THE CRISIS IN THE LEGAL
PROFESSION Is TRANSFORMING AMERICAN SOCIETY (1994); see also Leslie W. Abramson,
Deciding Recusal Motions: Who Judges the Judges?, 28 VAL. U. L. REV. 543 (1994); Mar-
vin E. Aspen, The Search for Renewed Civility in Litigation, 28 VAL. U. L. REV. 513 (1994);
Rob Atkinson, Beyond the New Role Morality for Lawyers, 51 MD. L. REV. 853 (1992);
John C. Buchanan, The Demise of Legal Professionalism: Accepting Responsibility and
Implementing Change, 28 VAL. U. L. REV. 563 (1994); Warren E. Burger, The Decline of
Professionalism, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 949 (1995); Daniel R. Coquillette, Professionalism:
The Deep Theory, 72 N.C. L. REV. 1271 (1994); Brent E. Dickson & Julia B. Jackson,
Renewing Lawyer Civility, 28 VAL. U. L. REV. 531 (1994); James R. Elkins, The Moral
Labyrinth of Zealous Advocacy, 21 CAP. U. L. REV. 735 (1992); Craig Enoch, Incivility in
the Legal System? Maybe It's the Rules, 47 SMU L. REV. 199 (1994); Byron C. Keeling, A
Prescription for Healing the Crisis in Professionalism: Shifting the Burden of Enforcing
Professional Standards of Conduct, 25 TEX. TECH L. REV. 31 (1993); Amy R. Mashburn,
Professionalism as Class Ideology: Civility Codes and Bar Hierarchy, 28 VAL. U. L. REV.
657 (1994); Russell G. Pearce, The Professionalism Paradigm Shift: Why Discarding Pro-fessional Ideology Will Improve the Conduct and Reputation of the Bar, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1229 (1995); Edward D. Re, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Legal Profes-
sion, 68 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 85 (1994).
4. See Rob Atkinson, A Dissenter's Commentary on the Professionalism Crusade, 74
TEX. L. REV. 259, 343 (1995) (presenting a comprehensive view of scholarly as well as
professional literature on the subject of professionalism as well as a critique of the "profes-
sionalism crusade" which "assumes that there is one true way to be a good person and a
conscientious lawyer"); Heidi L. Feldman, Codes and Virtues: Can Good Lawyers Be
Good Ethical Deliberators?, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 885, 887 (1996) (contrasting the "techno-
cratic lawyer" who is a "legal minimalist" with the "honorable attorney" who, while work-
ing diligently on behalf of her client, encourages the client to consider "a host of factors
other than the client's own narrow self-interest when defining goals and choosing means to
attain them"). See also Paul R. Tremblay, Practiced Moral Activism, 8 ST. THOMAS L.
REV. 9 (1995), for an examination of the issues faced by the legal practitioner in being both
a "good lawyer" and a "good person"; Mark N. Aaronson, Be Just to One Another: Prelim-
inary Thoughts on Civility, Moral Character, and Professionalism, 8 ST. THOMAS L. REV.
113 (1995), where the author investigates the attractions as well as limitations of "civility
codes" for practicing lawyers. Professor Aaronson maintains that, by relying on classical
ideas of civility, lawyers can cultivate the "strength of character needed to exercise self-
discipline when making practical or ethical choices." Id. at 116. In this context, see Robert
J. Araujo, Humanitarian Jurisprudence: The Quest for Civility, 40 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 715
(1996).
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particular double-murder trial which took place in Los Angeles last year.5
Without referring to any specific attorney, I would briefly like to con-
sider one type of lawyer whom I shall call the "victorious lawyer." The
victorious lawyer is a model which stands as a counterpoint to the "virtu-
ous lawyer" who is the subject of this Article. Now, the victorious lawyer
is not a corrupt individual who schemes and plots to violate laws and
contemptuously flaunt ethical standards of conduct. He is, however, the
lawyer who has only one goal: to win regardless of the cost and regard-
less of the compromises made with norms which lawyers and lay people
alike regard as the requirements of participating in civil and courteous
society. The victorious lawyer plays hardball as that term has been de-
fined by various members of the profession within the last decade. 6 This
lawyer takes pride in his arsenal of victory-oriented tactics which, while
not strictly forbidden by the law, nonetheless keep him ever so close to
the narrow line between proper and improper professional conduct. For
example, the victorious lawyer knows how to wear the opposing lawyer
and party down with lawful but unnecessary discovery requests. The vic-
torious lawyer knows that the crushing financial burdens facing the oppo-
nent who is to comply with such discovery requests may prompt it to
concede its case or to accept a compromise which would otherwise be
deemed unreasonable in order to conclude litigation of an otherwise just
case which it can no longer afford. Another tactic found in this store-
house is to file court documents at times known to be the most inconve-
nient or unreasonable for the other side. The victorious lawyer is
scrupulous about not breaking the law. However, his modus operandi
carries the hallmark of aggressively seeking all advantages and making no
concessions-an identification which over time alienates the victorious
lawyer from the bench, the bar, and opposing parties. In characterizing
such a lawyer, the term "honorable" would not come to mind.
Yet, it is important to remember that there are many lawyers-perhaps
a majority-who are the solid citizens of the profession who day after day
offer sound counsel to and provide ethical advocacy on behalf of their
clients-clients who may be amongst the poorest of the poor in court-
appointed cases or the large, solvent clients who are the envy of corpo-
rate America or someone or some institution in between these two ex-
tremes. I would suggest at this point in my Article, that these lawyers
5. See, e.g., Steven Keeva, Storm Warnings, 81 A.B.A. J. 77 (1995); Colman McCar-
thy, Justice by the Dollar, WASH. POST, Aug. 13, 1994, at A17.
6. See, e.g., Catherine T. Clarke, Missed Manners in Courtroom Decorum, 50 MD. L.
REv. 945 (1991); Barlett H. McGuire, Reflections of a Recovering Litigator: Adversarial
Excess in Civil Proceedings, 164 FED. RULES DECISIONS 283 (1996); E. Norman Veasey,
Rambo Be Gone! Delaware's Chief Justice Comes Down Hard on the Miscreants of the
Legal Profession, Bus. L. TODAY, Jan.-Feb. 1995, at 12; Gerald Wetlaufer, The Ethics of
Lying in Negotiations, 75 IOWA L. REV. 1219 (1990); Bradley W. Foster, Comment, Playing
Hardball in Federal Court: Judicial Attempts to Referee Unsportsmanlike Conduct, 55 J.
AIR L. & COM. 223 (1989); Andrew R. Herron, Comment, Collegiality, Justice, and the




probably exercise virtuous qualities in their personal and professional
lives.7 In my twelve years of practicing law,8 I encountered many such
individuals who were and remain virtuous people and virtuous
professionals.
My suggestion may present an alternative image to the popularly held
notion of lawyers as self-seeking hucksters who will make any argument
to win a case for any client. The alternative I shall identify and discuss is
the virtuous lawyer. When I first began to discuss this topic with teaching
colleagues of mine-some lawyers, others not-I received the same gen-
eral response which usually began with laughter and followed with a
statement that went something like, "But aren't those contradictions of
terms?"
It is my goal to show that the contradiction is not a universal but a
particular-a particular which can be remedied as more members of the
profession appropriate the essential qualities and habits of the virtuous
lawyer in their own lives. Moreover, my further purpose in writing this
Article is to demonstrate that there is such a person as the virtuous law-
yer who sees the correlation between the law, the legal system it pro-
duces, and the fashion in which members of society live in right
relationship with one another. I propose to study the link between the
statement quoted from the third verse of Psalm 106 at the beginning of
this Article and an approach to understanding both the desirability and
role of the virtuous lawyer today. Therefore, from time to time I turn to
the Hebrew and Christian scriptures which present another model of the
virtuous individual (lawyer) and the legal system. 9 The story of these pil-
grims struggling with their quest for virtue and searching for God's justice
in this world provides useful material for understanding what human
legal institutions and their search for justice is or should be about. In
short, there are lawyers who see themselves living with justice in their
professional as well as personal lives because they also practice virtue. 10
7. See generally VIRTUE: NoMos XXXIV (John W. Chapman & William A. Galston
eds., 1992). Professor Gaiston comments on the revival of scholarly interest in virtue and
the impact of this contemporary investigation on legal and political institutions. As he
states, "However virtue is to be theoretically understood, it leads irresistibly to a practical
concern with the social, legal, and political structures that help shape individuals." Id. at 2.
8. I was engaged in the active practice of law from 1974 to 1986 whereupon I entered
the Society of Jesus (the Jesuits), a Roman Catholic religious order.
9. For example, after the exile from Egypt, Israel was instructed by Moses on God's
law for the people. One example of this is a portion of Exodus which exhorts the people to
never spread false reports, serve as a malicious witness, side with the majority in a lawsuit
if that would pervert justice, be unnecessarily partial to any party to a lawsuit, or pervert
the justice due the downtrodden. See Exodus 23:1-6 (NRSV).
10. A wonderful and helpful introduction to the relationship between virtue and the
legal profession is Professor Thomas L. Shaffer's Inaugural Howard Lichtenstein Lecture in
Legal Ethics: Lawyer Professionalism as a Moral Argument, 26 GONz. L. REV. 393 (1990-
1991). Later in this Article, I investigate the distinction between principles and virtues.
For Shaffer, "Virtue words, as distinguished from principle words, speak about moral quali-
ties." Id. at 396 (emphasis in original). Shaffer identifies with Aristotle's method of teach-
ing morals by "describing the virtues ... noticed in admirable people." Id. The essence of
virtues is that they are "good habits." Id.
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Before I begin to develop my thesis and offer justification for its tenets, I
take the reader on a digression and an excursion along a path less trav-
eled: the world of Hollywood-a place not too distant from the city of
Los Angeles mentioned earlier. The excursion spins off of a creation of
Hollywood, namely from the film The Wizard of Oz." It is within this
film, a film which in large part portrays reality in addition to fantasy, that
a person not initiated to the world of virtues is introduced to subjects vital
to this Article. It is through the well-known characters of this fable that
we see another familiar group of pilgrims who are seeking particular vir-
tues in order to achieve the just results to which they and others are
entitled.
II. A DIGRESSION AND AN EXCURSION DOWN THE
YELLOW BRICK ROAD
In the opening moments of the film The Wizard of Oz, we see young
Dorothy-and Toto, too-being carried by a cyclone from the farm lands
of Kansas to the far off Munchkindland. After crash-landing with her
house and conveniently dispatching the Wicked Witch of the East, the
nemesis of the local Munchkinders, Dorothy-and, yes, Toto, too-seek
their way back to Kansas. The Munchkinders, while being very kind, are
unable to help Dorothy and her faithful canine return home. But they
know that the great wizard who lives in the Emerald City should be able
to help her if anyone can. When she inquires how she can get to the
Emerald City, the locals tell her to follow the yellow brick road, and that
she does. While en route to the Emerald City, she encounters three other
entities who, like herself-and, yes, once again, Toto, too-also are in
search of something. It is at this stage of the film that we viewers begin to
see the relevance of the film to my theme about the virtuous lawyer.
After leaving Munchkindland, Dorothy passes by a field and en-
counters a scarecrow-mind you, not just any scarecrow, but the Scare-
crow. As she passes by this poorly attired fellow, he calls out to Dorothy
and seeks her assistance to be released from his restraining perch. After
she complies and they talk for a bit, Dorothy relates her plan that in or-
der to get home she must seek the assistance of the Great Wizard. The
Scarecrow takes a fancy to that and proclaims that perhaps he too can
seek that which he has always wanted-a brain. Apparently, scarecrows
do not come with brains as standard equipment-straw, yes; cast-off
clothes, yes; but, alas, no brain.
As the story develops, this ensemble of Dorothy and the Scarecrow-
and, dare I say yet again, Toto, too-make way to the Emerald City and
their audience with the Great Wizard. As their journey evolves, they en-
counter a badly rusted tin woodsman-mind you, not just any tin woods-
man, but the Tin Woodsman. Once cleaned up and nicely lubricated, he
proclaims that he needs a heart since his builders seemed to have left that
11. Tim WIZARD OF Oz (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1939).
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out of his design. It makes capital sense that he join the other seekers
and present his petition for a heart to the Great Wizard of Oz. As the
sojourners make way to the Emerald City, their progress is momentarily
delayed by the appearance of a lion-mind you, not just any lion, but the
Cowardly Lion. He too seems to be deficient in that which makes a lion a
lion. He is cowardly, and lions ought not to be cowardly; they are sup-
posed to be strong, commanding, and courageous. He agrees to join our
band of Ozian pilgrims so that he might petition the Great Wizard for the
courage he apparently lacks.
Ultimately, the story brings these adventurers to their destination and
their destinies. Each of these pilgrims sought something they thought
they lacked or lost: Dorothy wanted to go home, and indeed she does-
along with, you guessed it, Toto, too. But Dorothy also discovers some-
thing else, namely the gift of prudence-a virtue which provides both the
means and endurance for achieving whatever else needs to be achieved.
The Scarecrow, who thought he needed a brain, discovers that he pos-
sessed all along the virtue of wisdom-the virtue which provides the in-
sight and sagacity to know what should be done next. Our Tin
Woodsman, who thought he was cardio-deficient, discovers that he pos-
sessed compassion from the outset-the virtue of caring and concern for
others. Of course, there is the Cowardly Lion who, when all is said and
done, always possessed courage-the virtue which provides the necessary
personal reinforcement needed when a person-or a lion-seems to be
standing all alone. I ought to mention the Great Wizard of Oz at this
stage, for he too displays another important virtue, the virtue of justice-
for he helps these pilgrims recognize and realize the goals which they had
sought.
The excursion down the Yellow Brick Road must end here. But the
journey of this Article continues by examining in greater detail these vir-
tues and what they mean or can mean to the members of the legal
profession.
III. THE VIRTUES AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO LAW
AND LAWYERS
Since the Watergate episode some twenty years ago, the relevance of
ethics to the legal profession has received more attention. Some of the
language and the concepts relied upon in the context of discussion about
ethical and moral lawyers is associated with human virtues. Sometimes
we hear that a lawyer must possess the courage and fortitude needed to
see that justice is done. Think of Atticus Finch in the film To Kill A
Mockingbird.12 Among other qualities, Finch possessed the attribute of
compassion which tempers with mercy the judgment of the wrongdoer,
yet extends compassion and sorrow to the suffering of the victim for the
12. To KILL A MOCKINGBIRD (Universal Pictures 1962).
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overriding goal of equity, of justice under law. 13
The reader may ask the question if this is all that need be known about
virtue? No, there is considerably more as I shall demonstrate. I simply
suggest here that the virtue criteria used to evaluate a lawyer and what
the lawyer does are, when taken as a coherent package, vital to the con-
sideration of professional responsibility.14 In presenting and arguing my
position, I will first introduce the reader to what virtues are, and, second,
I shall illustrate how they form a set of criteria distinct from other criteria
traditionally used in evaluating professional conduct of lawyers.
I begin this part of the discussion with Alasdair MacIntyre's prelimi-
nary definition of virtue as "an acquired human quality the possession
and exercise of which tends to enable us to achieve those goods which are
internal to practices and the lack of which effectively prevents us from
achieving such goods."' 5 Putting this remark in the context of the quota-
tion from Psalm 106 at the beginning of this Article, we see another voice
suggesting the inextricable link between justice (the goal of the legal pro-
fession) and virtue. An important foundation for Maclntyre is Thomas
Aquinas who understood virtue to be "a good quality of the mind" by
13. In William Shakespeare's The Merchant of Venice, Portia, portraying a doctor of
the law, exhorts Shylock to reconsider his demand for Antonio's pound of flesh:
The quality of mercy is hot strain'd,
It droppeth as the gentle rain from heaven
Upon the place beneath. It is twice blest:
It blesseth him that gives and him that takes.
'Tis mightiest in the mightiest, it becomes
The throned monarch better than his crown,
His sceptre shows the force of temporal power,
The attribute to awe and majesty,
Wherein doth sit the dread and fear of kings;
But mercy is above this sceptered sway,
It is enthroned in the heart of kings,
It is an attribute to God himself;
And earthly power doth then show likest God's
When mercy seasons justice. Therefore, Jew,
Though justice be thy plea consider this,
That in the course of justice, none of us
Should see salvation. We do pray for mercy,
And that same prayer doth teach us all to render
The deeds of mercy.
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE MERCHANT OF VENICE act 4, sc. 1, 11. 184-202 (G. Blake-
more Evans ed., Riverside Shakespeare 1974).
14. For an illuminating and applicable discussion of general responsibility in a Chris-
tian context that has bearing on my Article, see WILLIAM SCHWEIKER, RESPONSIBILITY
AND CHRISTIAN ETHIcs 65-69, 161-63 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1995) (examining the contri-
bution of Aristotle and Aquinas to personal responsibility through their investigation of
virtues and virtuous conduct).
15. ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY 191 (No-
tre Dame, 1984) (emphasis omitted). Maclntyre defines "practice" as follows:
[A]ny coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative human
activity through which goods internal to that form of activity are realized in
the course of trying to achieve those standards of excellence which are ap-
propriate to, and partially definitive of, that form of activity, with the result
that human powers to achieve excellence, and human conceptions of the




which people live righteously. 16 If the function of ethical systems is to
guide people-including lawyers-in their moral deliberation toward
right action,17 a legal profession which treasures virtue in its work will
direct lawyers to become better moral agents.' 8 The course which the
moral agent (lawyer) takes is directed toward a goal, a telos.19 Because
individual humans are also social beings whose existence is grounded in
relationships with others, the concept of the telos can assist the lawyer to
understand and answer better the ethical and moral questions which
members of the legal profession face as they promote the reconciliation
of differences within society.20
Joseph Kotva has argued that the telos of virtue-based method is inex-
tricably intertwined with the means to achieve the goal because this ap-
proach provides the means to move society toward a better
understanding of the end, an end which forms a specific kind of person
and promotes a kind of society that stipulates behavior directed toward a
just society.21 Kotva points out that for some individuals, the kind of per-
son each of us is identifies the kind of moral questions we address. 22 His
observation and conclusion suggest that the practice of virtue acknowl-
edges the sense of "otherness"; that is, in making moral decisions about
who we are, what our goal is, and what means we use to get there, we
necessarily think of other individuals as we work toward the goal. The
practice of virtue relies on a sense of community, on an awareness of
relationships with others. I suggest here that the notion of living in right
relation with others parallels the cultivation of the virtue of justice in
one's life. Since much of contemporary American jurisprudence focuses
on the individual and the autonomous person's rights and liberties, a reli-
ance on virtues and virtue-based ethical systems may help lawyers under-
stand that (1) the individual is simply not only an autonomous being but
is also a member of a community and (2) both the individual and the
community are significantly affected by the law and those who administer
it. Acknowledgment of this point is important in the exercise of a law-
16. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, I-II, Q. 55, art. 4 (Benziger Brothers,
Inc. ed. & Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans., 1947).
17. James F. Keenan, S.J., Virtue Ethics: Making a Case as It Comes of Age, 67
THOUGHT 115 (1992).
18. Id. at 116.
19. MACINTYRE, supra note 15, at 203 ("[Tlhere is a telos which transcends the limited
goods of practices by constituting the good of a whole human life, the good of a human life
conceived as a unity .. "). Accord Keenan, supra note 17, at 120, 123; Joseph J. Kotva, An
Appeal for a Christian Virtue Ethic, 67 THOUGHT 158, 159 (1992). AS James Keenan
stresses, "Only in virtue ethics is a telos constitutive of method; no other ethical system can
make that claim." Keenan, supra note 17, at 123.
20. I have developed the idea of a telos underlying the social institution of law else-
where. See Robert J. Araujo, S.J., The Teleology of the Law: Responsible Citizenship and
Discipleship, 35 CATH. LAW. 57 (1992).
21. Kotva, supra note 19, at 159. As this author further suggests, "the means cannot
be separated from the end because the means are central to the end. A telos which embod-
ies the virtues of justice, courage, and fidelity cannot be severed from acts and social ar-
rangements that are just, courageous, and faithful." Id. at 160.
22. Id. at 166.
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yer's duties. Lawyers are, after all, often asked to help resolve conflict
between people; they are called upon by litigants to render justice by par-
ticipating in the resolution of the disagreement. Lawyers are concerned
about individuals who live in community, not individuals who live in iso-
lation from one another. While individuals have rights which should be
protected, this is not the only matter with which lawyers are or can be
concerned. The relationship between the individual and the community
is a subject that has been at the heart of the study of virtues, the virtuous
person, and justice for some time.23
Plato was an early commentator who investigated the relationship be-
tween virtue and justice. For him, justice was the fundamental compo-
nent of society, the "necessary conduct in everything from beginning to
end."24 Above all else, justice-as a virtue-was the guarantor of other
important virtues like temperance, courage, and wisdom which will be
momentarily addressed. 25 These virtues are important because they aid
in directing human conduct, which helps achieve the goal of a society in
which its members live in right relationship with one another. Aristotle
saw justice as the "complete virtue" in the context of a person being in
right relation with his neighbor.26 In refining his understanding of justice
as the greatest of virtues in which a person seeks to be in right relation-
ship with others, Aristotle concluded that people who are true friends
(i.e., they wish well to one another 27) have no need for any other kind of
justice because their friendship is the truest form of justice.28 Thomas
Aquinas saw virtue as the good quality of the mind which facilitates peo-
ple living righteously; he also acknowledged that the virtue of justice is a
good habit in which each person perpetually renders to the other person
that which is due (i.e., the suum cuique).29 Mary Ann Glendon has reaf-
finned Aristotle's position in her argument that the tendency to make
rights and privacy absolute in the American legal culture has minimized
23. See SCOTT D. GERBER, To SECURE THESE RIGHTS: THE DECLARATION OF INDE-
PENDENCE AND CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 36 (1995) (examining Samuel Adams's
belief that virtue, while not an end in itself, was an important means to secure the natural
rights of individuals). As Gerber explains, "The cultivation of virtue was but a way of
accomplishing that objective [protection of natural rights], for virtue instilled in the people
the necessity of restraining their selfish impulses-impulses that would otherwise render
natural rights insecure." Id.
24. PLATO, REPUBLIC bk. IV, at 432d (G.M.A. Grube trans., 1992).
25. Id.
26. ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETICS bk. V, ch. 1, at 1129b (David Ross trans.,
Oxford Univ. Press 1980).
27. l bk. VIII, ch. 3, at 1156b.
28. Id bk. VII, ch. 14, at 1155a. For a helpful discussion of diverse views concerning
the role of friendship in practical legal counseling, see John M.A. DiPippa, Jacob's Bless-
ing: A Review of Shaffer's and Cochran's Model of Moral Counseling, 18 U. ARK. LITTLE
ROCK L.J. 85 (1995); Jack L. Sammons, Rank Strangers to Me: Shaffer and Cochran's
Friendship Model of Moral Counseling in the Law Office, 18 U. ARK. LrrrLE ROCK L.J. 1
(1995); Thomas L. Shaffer & Robert F. Cochran, Lawyers as Strangers and Friends: A
Reply to Professor Sammons, 18 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 69 (1995).
29. AourNAS, supra note 16, at II-I, Q. 58, art. 1.
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the significance of fraternity. 30 Glendon argues that unrestricted individ-
ualism can foster a climate that is inhospitable to "society's losers" (those
who are especially dependent on others), and because it neglects civil so-
ciety, it undermines both civic and personal virtue. As she further argues,
individualism "shuts out potentially important aids to the process of self-
correcting learning [and promotes] mere assertion over reason-giving."'31
The virtue of justice, like the legal system itself, is practiced or engaged
in by human beings in a community setting. It is not understood as
something which is good or proper simply for the individual alone; rather,
it manifests itself in good relationships or true friendship where each per-
son renders the other his or her due.32 Justice as a virtue manifests itself
in the midst of people who are in relationship with one another; it does
not exist in the vacuum of persons who are isolated from one another.
Essentially, the virtue of justice depends on community; its prerequisite is
two or more people who acknowledge one another's existence and where
each honors the other person's right to co-exist (because each expects his
or her own right to exist to be honored by the other). An important goal
of the virtue of justice is to achieve multiple levels of reciprocity through-
out society in which every person renders to one another those concerns
which each has for the self. The virtuous person, who becomes the virtu-
ous lawyer and who will have the duty to render justice, can see this
readily.
Much of the kind of justice which has emerged in the present-day
American legal culture has lost a good deal of its community-oriented
goal. Many contemporary understandings about "justice" lead to a nar-
row focus on individual, but not community, concerns because of the
strong desire to protect individual rights and privacy above all else. This
necessitates, for John Finnis, an understanding of justice as the realization
of basic human goods for one's self as well as for others.33 In a similar
fashion, Mary Ann Glendon points out that the social, the communal,
and the teleological components of duties which are the correlatives of
rights are infrequently discussed in this contemporary environment. 34
She correctly argues that these components are essential to dealing justly
30. MARY A. GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL Dis-
COURSE 47-48 (1991). Christopher Mooney has similarly commented on this theme in the
context of the law and legal profession. He argues that the law's "privatizing impulse has
tended to become dominant and it no longer conceives its primary mission to be the re-
sponsible exercise of public virtue." CHRISTOPHER MOONEY, S.J., PUBLIC VIRTUE: LAW
AND THE SOCIAL CHARACTER OF RELIGION Xi (1986).
31. GLENDON, supra note 30, at 14.
32. At Exodus 19:15, the Hebrew people were notified about the importance of giving
the other that which is due: "You shall not render an unjust judgment; you shall not be
partial to the poor or defer to the great: with justice you shall judge your neighbor." In a
similar vein, the Prophet Zechariah warned: "Thus says the Lord of hosts: Render truejudgments, show kindness and mercy to one another; do not oppress the widow, the or-
phan, the alien, or the poor; and do not devise evil in your hearts against one another."
Zechariah 7:9-10.
33. JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 161 (1980).
34. GLENDON, supra note 30, at x-xiii, 14, 45, 47-48, 171-72.
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with some of the urgent legal issues which have, in the American context,
been cloaked with near-absolute rights of privacy, individual autonomy,
and isolation. 35 To balance the excessive and narrow focus on the rights
which emerge from the principle of autonomy, Glendon acknowledges
the importance of understanding the needs of all the parties involved in
order to reach the just end concerning the rights and responsibilities asso-
ciated with many of the disagreements between members of society which
lawyers are asked to referee.
If we try to determine what is the just goal for both society as a whole
and its individual members, a virtuous solution to interpersonal conflict
begins to emerge. In response to legal controversies that work their way
into courts, justice-as-virtue avoids the problems associated with the
"winner-take-all" attitude that characterizes much of the process of litiga-
tion over which today's lawyers supervise and direct. But, as a practical
matter, how do we move toward the goal of justice as virtuous people?
This is where the virtue of prudence comes into play.
If the virtue of justice prescribes the just goal or end, then prudence
and compassion are the means to that end. 36 Permeating prudence is the
35. MARY A. GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW 38 (1987).
While proceeding from a different school of thought, Joseph Raz has offered a parallel
thought. JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 250 (1986). Raz addressed the sub-
ject of personal autonomy and suggested that while "an individual's freedom, understood
as personal autonomy, sometimes conflicts with the interests of others, it also depends on
those interests and can be obtained only through collective goods which do not benefit
anyone unless they benefit everyone." Id. Elsewhere, he acknowledges that the morally
good person recognizes that the individual's interests are so inextricably related with those
of other members of society "that it is impossible to separate his personal well-being from
his moral concerns." Id. Raz makes it clear from the outset of The Morality of Freedom
that his argument supports "a liberal morality on non-individualistic grounds." Id. at 18.
His search is for a "morality which regards personal autonomy as an essential ingredient of
the good life, and regards the principle of autonomy, which imposes duties on people to
secure for all the conditions of autonomy .... Id. at 415. Raz does not offer an elaborate
definition of the good life. He explains the good life as "a life which is a free creation" in
which there will be "a multiplicity of valuable options to choose from .. " Id. at 412.
36. Kotva, supra note 19, at 166 (acknowledging his debt to James Keenan, S.J. for this
insight); see also Anthony T. Kronman, Alexander Bickel's Philosophy of Prudence, 94
YALE L.J. 1567 (1985) (examining, through the vehicle of Alexander Bickel's political phi-
losophy, the value of prudence as both a political and legal virtue). Kronman further ex-
plains prudence:
By prudence I mean a trait or characteristic that is at once an intellectual
capacity and a temperamental disposition. A prudent judgment or political
program is, above all, one that takes into account the complexity of its
human and institutional setting, and a prudent person, in this sense, is one
who sees complexities, who has an eye for what 3ickel called the "unruliness
of the human condition".... A prudent person is also one with a distinctive
character-a person who feels a certain "wonder" in the presence of com-
plex, historically evolved institutions and a modesty in undertaking their re-
form; who has a high tolerance for accommodation and delay and is able to
accept the final incommensurability between any system of ideas and the
world as it is given to us with all its raggedness and inconsistency; who values
consent but is not demoralized by the process of irrational compromise that
is often needed to achieve it. In the prudent person these qualities of intel-
lect and character are joined.
Id at 1569 (footnotes omitted).
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virtue of compassion which tempers the just end. 37 The virtues of pru-
dence and compassion work in tandem to promote improvements in so-
cial structures that will simultaneously display greater charity toward
both individuals and society at large-toward the perpetrator as well as
the victim.38 Those lawyers who recognize this have followed Aquinas
who saw the connection between the virtue of prudence which directs
people so that they relate their own good to the good of others (i.e., the
common good). 39 Moreover, Plato's understanding of temperance con-
tributes to an appreciation of the importance of prudence because pru-
dence is the virtue which brings harmony into society by promoting
"concord" among all the elements of the community. 40 Aristotle's under-
standing of this virtue concentrated on a state of character:
We may thus conclude that virtue or excellence is a characteristic
involving choice, and that it consists in observing the mean relative
to us, a mean which is defined by a rational principle, such as a man
of practical wisdom would use to determine it. It is the mean be-
tween two vices: the one of excess and the other of deficiency. 41
My concern about virtue raises considerations which every member of
the contemporary American legal profession can reflect upon and adopt.
I suspect that even the lawyer with the strongest client orientation would
take comfort knowing that the opponent-lawyer practices the virtues of
compassion and temperance. Both virtues provide an atmosphere which
helps reassure litigants that they will be heard out and that their individ-
ual and mutual concerns will be carefully evaluated-just as the oppo-
nent's concerns will be. The considerations set the stage for another
important virtue: courage.
Courage is the virtue that enables lawyers to meet the challenge of
harm or danger when they attempt to take action based on the care and
concern they have for individuals and communities. 42 The exercise of this
37. See Benjamin Zipursky, DeShaney and the Jurisprudence of Compassion, 65
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1101, 1134-37 (1990).
38. When the disciples asked Jesus to teach them how to pray, He reminded them to
"forgive us our debts, as we have also forgiven our debtors." Matthew 6:12.
39. AQUINAS, supra note 16, at IIa-IIae, Q. 50, art. 2. For a helpful discussion of the
relationship between virtue and law, see DANIEL WESTBERG, RIGHT PRACTICAL REASON:
ARISTOTLE, ACTION, AND PRUDENCE IN AQUINAS 229-44 (1994). Westberg cautions
against seeing only contradiction between law and virtue and examines the link between
them. Id. As Westberg argues, "The reading of the moral philosophy of Aquinas in deon-
tological terms is a bad mistake.. . ." Id. at 234. In the context of the law profession and
the common or public good, Robert Katzman has acknowledged the "inextricable link
between the self-interest of lawyers (and their responsibility as members of a profession)
and the public." Robert Katzmann, Themes in Context, in THE LAW FIRM AND THE PUB-
LIC GOOD 15 (Katzmann ed., 1995). As he states, "the law firm and the public good are
inextricably linked and that each can draw strength from the other in ways that nourish
both." Id.
40. PLATO, supra note 24, bk. IV, 431c.
41. ARISTOTLE, supra note 26, bk. II, ch. 6, at 1107a.
42. MACINTYRE, supra note 15, at 117-18. In the context of the legal profession, Dean
Anthony Kronman has described courage as resisting the pressures of "doing what his
client wants in every case." See ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING
IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 145 (1993). As Kronman further states, "A coura-
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virtue takes place when lawyers facing risks and threats in controversial
cases (e.g., Atticus Finch representing a black man falsely accused of rap-
ing a white woman) can rely on the support of individuals who wish for
and are prepared to. seek the just end for all.43
Underlying the virtues of justice (which helps us recognize the goal),
prudence (which provides the means for acting justly), and courage
(which reinforces lawyers who take the action essential to reaching the
telos), is the virtue of wisdom. Wisdom provides the insight, the sagacity
by which lawyers come to understand their corporate as well as individual
goods and the nexus between them.44 In the realm of lawyers whose duty
it is to help reconcile differences, wisdom enlightens the lawyer to the
variety and subtlety of issues and facts in each case. Cultivation of this
virtue can open the mind as well as the heart to matters which the person
not relying on the virtue of wisdom may miss. It parallels prudence and
works in tandem with it.45 In a virtue-oriented approach to many of
today's difficult legal issues, wisdom guides lawyers in the quest for un-
derstanding who we are as individuals and as members of society and
geous lawyer is prepared to take risks for what he or she believes is right-to risk anger,
contempt, and a lower income for the sake of the law's own good-and nothing can be a
substitute for the fortitude this requires." Id.
43. KRONMAN, supra note 42, at 123. See 2 Chronicles 15:5-7, for the prophecy of
Azariah reminding Asa and the people not to abandon hope for God would give them
courage if only they believed in Him:
In those times it was not safe for anyone to go or come, for great distur-
bances afflicted all the inhabitants of the lands. They were broken in pieces,
nation against nation and city against city, for God troubled them [because of
their apostasy] with every sort of distress. But you, take courage! Do not let
your hands be weak, for your work shall be rewarded!
In a similar fashion, we are reminded in Acts 23:11 that God came to give courage to St.
Paul when he was on trial before the religious authorities: "That night the Lord stood near
him and said, 'Keep up your courage! For just as you have testified for me in Jerusalem, so
you must bear witness also in Rome."' Id.
44. A remarkable example of this virtue is King Solomon, who, when presented with a
difficult case (trying to determine which woman claiming the same child was the real
mother), was up to the challenge to dispense justice, as we are reminded in 1 Kings 3:28,
"All Israel heard of the judgment that the king had rendered; and they stood in awe of
[Solomon] because they perceived that the wisdom of God was in him, to execute justice."
Id. It is clear that Israel was reminded of the correlation between wisdom and justice,
when Moses, in Deuteronomy 4:5-8, told them,
See, just as the Lord my God has charged me, I now teach you statutes and
ordinances for you to observe in the land that you are about to enter and
occupy. You must observe them diligently, for this will show your wisdom
and discernment to the peoples, who, when they hear all these statutes, will
say, "Surely this great nation is a wise and discerning people!" For what
other nation has a god so near to it as the Lord our God is whenever we call
to him? And what other nation has statutes and ordinances as just as this
entire law that I am setting before you today?
Id.
45. The Book of Proverbs is a great source of the correlation between wisdom and
prudence. For example, in Proverbs 1:2-7, we are reminded the "fear of the Lord" is essen-
tial: "For learning about wisdom and instruction, for understanding words of insight, for
gaining instruction in wise dealing, righteousness, justice, and equity; to teach shrewdness
to the simple, knowledge and prudence to the young-.... The fear of the Lord is the
beginning of knowledge." Id. The author of Proverbs personifies Wisdom and has her say,
"I, wisdom, live with prudence, and I attain knowledge and discretion." Proverbs 812.
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what we want to become. In the American culture that is strongly char-
acterized by "individual autonomy and isolation," 46 the focus of individ-
ual and community attention on who we are can be blurred. Wisdom
helps remove the blur that otherwise inhibits the ability to identify not
only who we are now but also what we want to be in the future. When
wisdom permeates our consciousness, our knowledge of ourselves be-
comes more secure and more certain. And, when our self-knowledge
grows, the vision of who we want to become both as individuals and as
members of communities will become all the more clear. And, when our
knowledge of whom we want to become is better defined, our "moral
idealism [can] be found and maintained. '47
IV. WHY NOT RULES RATHER THAN VIRTUE?
I have outlined the virtues which have application to the role, duty, and
responsibility of lawyers. I suggest here that the virtuous lawyer is con-
cerned about acting ethically and morally in one's attempt to bring peace-
ful resolution of disputes among citizens. But the virtuous lawyer also
uses rules-the law-as the foremost means to achieve a good at the
heart of the legal system (i.e., the goal of the just result). In today's dis-
cussion of legal and political philosophy, a distinction is often made be-
tween the right and the good, or, as some prefer, the deontological and
the teleological. Another way of thinking about the distinction is the pri-
ority of rules or principles over the priority of goals. The distinction has
sometimes been seen as the contrast between Kantian and some utilita-
rian concepts of justice where rules are more important to the first
whereas results are more important to the second.
For purposes of this examination, it would be helpful to make some
distinctions between a rules or principles-based and virtue-based legal
system. Ultimately the virtue-based system will-unlike principles-based
ones-consider more comprehensively the spectrum of interests and ex-
periences which must be addressed by the legal profession.48 The appli-
46. GLENDON, supra note 35, at 38.
47. Keenan, supra note 17, at 123.
48. In this context, Dean Kronman offers some valuable insight. See Kronman, supra
note 36, at 1570, where the author notes that while the late Alexander Bickel believed that
"no good society can be unprincipled," neither can it be "principle-ridden." Kronman
notes that Bickel discerned that "abstract theories and moral imperatives.., have a 'tyran-
nical tendency' . . . [because] it is . . . self-destructive to insist on an uncompromising fidel-
ity to ideals which dismisses, out of principle, any consideration of the practical realities
that may stand in the way of their realization." Id. Kronman subsequently identifies pru-
dence to be what Bickel termed "'good practical wisdom'-the ability to 'resist the seduc-
tive temptations of moral imperatives,' to live with the disharmony between aspiration and
historical circumstance, and to search with 'balance and judgment' for those opportunities
that permit the marginal and evolutionary reconciliation of our principles and practices."
Id. (footnotes omitted). For another helpful discussion on the role of prudence and other
virtues in the legal profession, see CHARLES FRIED, RITrr AND WRONG 191-94 (1978). I
must assert my disagreement with Professor Fried's point that "[wie should absolve the
lawyer of personal moral responsibility for the result he accomplishes because the wrong is
wholly institutional." Id. at 192. While wrongs may be "wholly institutional," the fact of
the matter is that people, including many lawyers, are responsible for the institution, its
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cation of virtue enables the lawyer to discern that the distinction between
the right and the good, contrary to some views, reveals more about their
relation rather than their separation. A simultaneous appreciation by the
lawyer of the right and the good fortifies the practitioner's ability to ac-
knowledge the need to rely on virtue in the practice of the profession.
One way of understanding the distinction between the right and the
good is by examining those rules or principles which have a bearing on
the law and the legal profession. These principles are four in number: (1)
autonomy; (2) nonmaleficence; (3) beneficence; and (4) justice. Ulti-
mately, I shall argue that these principles inadequately address the pro-
fessional and ethical issues which lawyers must face today. They leave a
void in the discourse of the ethical considerations vital to the legal profes-
sion which a virtue-based system is better equipped to address.
This does not mean that there are no attractive elements of a princi-
ples-based ethical theory. Specific attractions will emerge from the fol-
lowing examination. Both principles-based and virtue-based theories
generally share a common element: justice. I now turn to my examina-
tion of the first ethical principle: autonomy.
The principle of autonomy can theoretically be defined as "self rule."
It is based on the Greek roots autos (self) and nomos (rule). 49 In the
context of biomedical ethics which has recently emerged as an important
topic of late twentieth century legal disputes involving termination of life
support such as Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health5° and
euthanasia such as Compassion in Dying v. Washington,51 as well as sev-
eral of the most recent abortion decisions, 52 autonomy can be viewed as
the principle based on "reflective individual choice" that is sometimes
qualified by an authority (e.g., a combination of professional medical ad-
vice and legal responsibilities or by "tradition, or social morality"). 53 In
the cases just cited, authority does not always constrain autonomous deci-
sion making. 54 However, the exercise of autonomy can adversely affect
makeup, and its achievements. Indeed, lawyers can be accountable for the wrongs which
are "wholly institutional" because lawyers and other officials create and sustain the policy-
and decision-making institutions which have produced not only the racist machinery of the
Third Reich but also the institution of American slavery, the doctrine of separate-but-
equal, and the justification of committing Japanese-American citizens to concentration
camps.
49. TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHics
67 (1989).
50. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
51. 49 F.3d 586 (9th Cir. 1995), rev'd en banc, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir.), cert. granted sub
nom. Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 37 (1996).
52. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). In the plurality opin-
ion of the Casey decision, the Court stated, "These matters, involving the most intimate
and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity
and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at
851. The plurality also argued that Roe v. Wade was "not only.., an exemplar of Griswold
liberty," but was also "a rule (whether or not mistaken) of personal autonomy and bodily
integrity .. " Id. at 857.
53. BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 49, at 71.
54. Id. at 72.
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the interests of others when one individual, even unconsciously, in the
exercise of personal autonomy challenges the interests of another person
who may be constrained from exercising his autonomy without challeng-
ing the first person.55 For example, the matter of a woman's exercising
her autonomy by electing to have an abortion distinctly challenges the
future ability of the child she carries to exercise its autonomy. While law-
yers may disagree on which harms are to be most (or least) avoided and
whose interests are to be most (or least) protected, we probably agree
that harm is to be avoided. This is the principle of nonmaleficence.
In its simplest form, the principle of nonmaleficence means: do no
harm.56 On first examination, the norm of avoiding harm seems rather
attractive. Most ethical individuals likely harbor the general notion that
no one should harm another. However, an examination of this principle
reveals that it, while attractive by itself, raises questions about the contri-
butions it can make to ethical discourse concerning numerous legal con-
troversies when we realize that it inadequately deals with the underlying
question: Who is harmed? This point takes on clarity when the historical
interests of slave owners was pitted against those of the slave, or when
national security interests were pitted against those of the Japanese-
Americans who lived on the west coast of the United States during the
Second World War. As admirable as the principle of avoiding harm is, it
does have limitations-particularly when it is only applied to one interest
but not both. What constitutes the avoidance of harm for one (and there-
fore good for the protection of that individual's interests) may be prejudi-
cial to the other-as Dred Scott and Fred Korematsu discovered. Thus, if
each lawyer turns to the positive effort to do good (as opposed to the
avoidance of doing harm), we might obtain a better principle, that is, be-
neficence, to address the difficult legal questions of the day.
Beneficence is the affirmative course of action one takes to do and
achieve good: it "requires positive steps to help others."' 57 In their analy-
sis involving medical ethics, Beauchamp and Childress have identified
two components within beneficence. The first is a positive component
which mandates "the provision of benefits (including the prevention and
55. See RAz, supra note 35, at 415. Raz develops the notion that personal autonomy
"is an essential of the good life" because in the exercise of autonomy, individual members
of society recognize that its enjoyment also imposes the duty to extend its enjoyment to
others. Id What ensures this for Raz is the presence of toleration (which he labels as a
"distinctive moral virtue") because it arrests "the desires, inclinations and convictions
which are thought by the tolerant person to be in themselves desirable." Id. at 401. For an
interesting perspective on the role of autonomy -in the liberal state, see Stephen
Gardbaum, Liberalism, Autonomy, and Moral Conflict, 48 STAN. L. REv. 385 (1996).
Gardbaum presents the view that autonomy is not simply a private matter in the state, but
a very public one which has a substantive, rather than simply a formal role of allowing the
individual to make choices. Id. Gardbaum recognizes, as does Raz, that autonomy is not
the only principle of value in the modem liberal state, because he acknowledges that its
unrestrained exercise can lead one person or group to deny that of another person or
group. Id. at 417. As Gardbaum maintains, "the genuine pursuit of autonomy and of more
equal autonomy cannot in practice be separated." Id.
56. BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 49, at 120, 194.
57. Id. at 121, 194.
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removal of harm as well as the promotion of welfare). ' 58 The second
element is a utilitarian component which "requires a balancing of benefits
and harms." 59 While nonmaleficence requires that a person refrain from
doing something (i.e., harm), beneficence imposes an affirmative obliga-
tion to take some action that will achieve a desirable, good result.60 The
principle of beneficence imposes an obligation for a person to undertake
an action that will bring about some good, even where there is no legal
obligation to do so. 61 As the attraction to this principle grows, the lawyer
tempted to rely too much on it must be aware of its limitation.
Again, lawyers will observe that the good that comes from one kind of
beneficence may conflict with the good that comes from obligations im-
posed by other applications of beneficence. By way of example, in Kore-
matsu v. United States,62 the fact that the petitioner was a loyal American
citizen did not mean that all citizens were loyal to the United States dur-
ing World War II and, therefore, above suspicion. The goal of achieving
liberty for most Japanese-American citizens would not contribute by it-
self to the legitimate national security interests of a government waging
war against a foreign enemy which received substantive support from do-
mestic subversives. Do principles-based systems therefore offer any reso-
lution of these competing efforts to seek different goods? The principle
of justice seems a likely candidate to provide assistance, if not a solution,
to the predicaments which have so far emerged from the applications of
the first three principles.
Justice has been understood through a wide range of understanding in
rules or principles-based systems. For Mill, justice was the utilitarian
calculus of the greatest good for the largest number.63 For H. L. A. Hart,
it is treating like cases alike. 64 For Rawls, it is the exercise of fairness.65
Others have seen justice as a synthesis of rewards, punishments, and enti-
tlements.66 Hart's understanding of justice (like cases being treated alike,
different cases being treated differently) constitutes what has been
termed as "formal justice."
Does the principle of justice really reconcile the conflict so that the
other party or side also receives the respect and dignity which it desires?
My answer is probably not if our civil legal system of rules and the judg-
ments based on those rules is content with rendering decisions that simply
make winners and losers without considering other relevant factors that
58. Id at 195.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 203.
61. Id. at 205. See also GLENDON, supra note 30, at 76-88 (discussing a moral obliga-
tion to take action like the Good Samaritan even though their is no legal obligation to do
so).
62. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
63. John S. Mill, Utilitarianism, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN STUART MILL: ETHICAL,
POLITICAL, AND RELIGIOUS 335 (Marshall Cohen ed., 1961).
64. H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 158 (1961).
65. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 111-14 (1971).
66. See BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 49, at 257.
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go to the heart of a virtue-based method. Does this mean that there is no
adequate solution founded on principles-based ethics which can give indi-
viduals who are represented by lawyers and are in conflict with one an-
other the justice they deserve? The conflicts between principles-based
arguments advanced by some members of the legal profession suggest
not. My point here is not to remake a principles-based ethical system
that will provide such justice. The task would be a most difficult one
indeed. Rather, I propose to look for the answer to this conflict of abso-
lutes in a virtue-based system.
As a member of the legal profession, each lawyer can profit from the
experience which members of other professions have had in situating
rules and virtue within their respective professions. Members of the med-
ical profession have addressed how virtues and virtue-based approaches
to professional issues can contribute to the betterment of health provid-
ers, patients, and society at large. The medical ethicist Edmund Pelle-
grino has offered insight which can provide lawyers with wise counsel
worth taking to heart:
A virtue-based ethic is inherently elitist, in the best sense, because its
adherents demand more of themselves than the prevailing morality.
It calls forth that extra measure of dedication that has made the best
physicians in every era exemplars of what the human spirit can
achieve. No matter to what depths a society may fall, virtuous per-
sons will always be the beacons that light the way back to moral sen-
sitivity; virtuous physicians [and lawyers] are the beacons that show
the way back to moral credibility for the whole profession.67
Pellegrino points to the dedication that makes a person the best in
one's profession not only on a technical level for a specific patient, but
also on the level of doing better for the entire community which the pro-
fessional serves. This extra measure of dedication might consequently
help the legal professional intensify the effort to achieve the goal of giv-
ing justice through the reconciliation of conflict and the promotion of
"concord" or harmony.
But to do justice, to render good decisions, to be as Dr. Pellegrino sug-
gests an "exemplar of what the human spirit can achieve," 68 a lawyer
must cultivate the virtue of wisdom. Wisdom enables the lawyer to dis-
cern what is at stake, to understand more clearly the concerns of those for
whom a case means so much. In the realm of late twentieth century
America, a virtuous lawyer cannot be satisfied with having some com-
mand of the case, the rules, and the parties whose vital interests are in-
volved. The wise lawyer, I suggest, must have both the capacity and the
will to see the case, the law, and the parties not only clearly and with an
open-mind; the virtuous lawyer must also see these things as they apply to
the history of the law, the building of judicial precedent, and the evolu-
67. Edmund Pellegrino, M.D., The Virtuous Physician, and the Ethics of Medicine, in




tion of the law as a coherent means of reconciling conflict both for today
and for the future.
Attributes often cited as those needed by good lawyers to reconcile
differences and to resolve conflict are patience, intelligence, integrity,
fairness, and open-mindedness. These attributes relate to the virtues that
facilitate attaining the just goal. Through personal patience, attentive-
ness, open-mindedness, self-restraint, seeking the truth, and integrity that
avoids even the slightest suspicion of prejudice for or against any specific
party, a lawyer is apt to see not only a way but a better way to resolving a
case, to reconciling conflict, to seeking the just end.
In some cases, pressure from the media, clients, other lawyers, and
even judges may restrain the virtuous lawyer from acting virtuously. The
virtue of courage keeps the open-minded lawyer from being swayed or
prejudiced by any pressure that could promote deviation from seeking
the just end. Courage, quite simply, is the virtue which steels the person
to meet the challenges that endanger or threaten the lawyer who must
survive the tide of strong public sentiment in order to protect those who
need protection.69 In order to achieve or at least seek justice, there can
be instances when a lawyer may have to stand alone and point out that
one's colleagues-and perhaps even the nation-are wrong. Precedent
for this virtue extends back to the Ancient Near East in which the "gov-
erning elite had a very special responsibility for the lower fringes of soci-
ety .. .7o
Examples of lawyers having the courage to stand apart from the major-
ity of their colleagues as well as the majority of strong, popular sentiment
were Justices McLean and Curtis who dissented in the antebellum case of
Dred Scott v. Sanford,71 which declared that blacks were not to be consid-
ered "citizens" for purposes of Constitutional protection.72 Another ex-
ample of courage was the first Justice Harlan who, in Plessy v. Ferguson,73
disagreed that the "separate but equal" doctrine was Constitutional.74
69. See MACINTYRE, supra note 15, at 179, where the author states:
We hold courage to be a virtue because the care and concern for individuals,
communities and causes which is so crucial to so much in practices requires
the existence of such a virtue. If someone says that he cares for some indi-
vidual, community or cause, but is unwilling to risk harm or danger on his,
her or its own behalf, he puts in question the genuineness of his care and
concern. Courage, the capacity to risk harm or danger to oneself, has its role
in human life because of this connection with care and concern.
In a small footnote which frequently eclipses the legal significance of the case in which it
appeared, the United States Supreme Court provided one arena in which a judge may have
to have courage to go against the tide to protect the unpopular, the minority, or the out-
cast. As the Court said in 1938, a "more searching judicial inquiry" may be needed to
protect "discrete and insular minorities." United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S.
144, 153 n.4 (1938).
70. NORBERT LOHFINK, S.J., OPTION FOR THE POOR: THE BASIC PRINCIPLE OF LIBER-
ATION THEOLOGY IN THE LIGHT OF THE BIBLE 18 (1987).
71. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
72. Id. at 529 (McLean, J., dissenting); id. at 564 (Curtis, J., dissenting).
73. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
74. Id. at 552.
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More recently, there were the dissents of Justices Murphy, Roberts, and
Jackson in the Japanese-American internment cases which were common-
place during World War 11.75 Courage was not the sole virtue possessed
by these lawyers as will be seen in Part VI, below.
V. ANOTHER DIGRESSION: THREE QUESTIONS
I believe that virtue-based ethics is an appropriate realm within which
we might find a more satisfactory solution to the difficult legal questions
of the day. In order to set this claim out, I shall now address three pre-
liminary matters. The first is to show that the distinction between rules
and virtues (or between the right and the good) is not absolute; for the
right and the good to be understood properly, it is necessary to see their
relationship to one another as well as their differences. Second, once
their relationship is established, the question begins to surface regarding
whether the legal reasoning needed to understand the rules and apply
them to achieve just results is a form of moral reasoning or not. Since I
shall demonstrate that legal reasoning must contain moral reasoning, a
third issue presents itself: Does the (virtuous) lawyer always have a duty
to follow and obey the law?
A. THE VIRTUous LAWYER DISTINGUISHES BETWEEN THE RIGHT
AND THE GOOD
Traditionally the distinction between the right and the good has been
viewed as the distinction between deontological and teleological ethical
and moral systems. The right is concerned with principles or rules,
whereas the good is concerned with goals.76 In A Theory of Justice, John
Rawls made the contrast by considering the good as emerging from utili-
tarian concerns whereas the right does not.77 But is this distinction sim-
ply between the separate entities of the right on the one hand and the
good on the other? Is it simply a difference between utilitarian and nonu-
tilitarian considerations? It is important for the virtuous lawyer to under-
stand that there can be overlap and complement as well as distinctions
between the right and the good which are often ignored.
Rawls's contribution is a useful start for examining the distinction be-
tween the right and the good and how both relate to the virtuous lawyer.
A major argument Rawls raised is that the individuals consigned to the
75. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 214; id. at 225 (Roberts, J., dissenting); id. at 233 (Murphy,
J., dissenting); id. at 242 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
76. See W. D. Ross, FOUNDATIONS OF ETHics (1939) [hereinafter Ross, FOUNDA-
TIONS OF ETHics] and W. D. Ross, THE RIGTrr AND THE GOOD (1930), for a detailed
discussion of the traditional view of the right and the good. Ross's Foundations of Ethics
was an effort to update, confirm, and revise the earlier views on moral theory which first
appeared in The Right and the Good. Ross reached the conclusion that, while moral good-
ness and rightness are independent in some ways, a morally good action can be the right
action in some circumstances. As will be seen with Rawls and Kymlicka, Ross earlier saw a
connection between the right and the good in some, but not all, situations. Ross, FOUNDA-
TIONS OF ETHics, supra, at 309.
77. RAWLs, supra note 65, § 68.
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"Original Position" would eschew utilitarian considerations and would
opt for the two principles of justice which are geared more to the right
than to the good.78 The keystone of Rawls's edifice of justice-as-fairness
avoids any movement toward the teleological which he believes utilitari-
anism makes. 79 Rawls observed that the utilitarian principle of achieving
the maximum good runs counter to the principle of justice because it
makes no effort to improve the conditions of the least well-off member of
the community. Because of this, Rawls concludes that "in justice as fair-
ness the concept of right is prior to that of the good. '80
To reinforce his point, Rawls proposed several contrasts between the
right and the good. His first distinction is that considerations about ra-
tional choice and deliberative rationality focus on how each person pur-
sues personal interests and goals once the two principles of justice are in
place. In other words, there is no need for principles about rational
choice because each person will be entitled to plan his life in accordance
with the two justice principles; rational choice succeeds rather than pre-
cedes the justice principles. The goods and the goals must be a function
of justice, not vice versa.8'
The second contrast made by Rawls is that his conception of the right
(i.e., the principles of justice) is uniform whereas conceptions of the good
can take on a variety of manifestations because they are determined by
individual rational choice. The good for one person may very well be
substantively different from that for another person because variety char-
acterizes rational choice; however, the right for each person is condi-
tioned by the justice principles which are not expressed by variety.82
A third contrast offered by Rawls centers on the point that the exercise
of rational choice and pursuit of the good require access to the facts and
conditions of a person's position in life whereas the exercise of the right
(i.e., the justice principles) is restricted by the veil of ignorance.8 3 Rawls
improvised on this distinction by introducing a subtlety here: once the
justice principles are "discovered" but before individuals pursue their
personal goods, the construction of constitutions and basic political/social
arrangements needs more information than is available under the veil of
ignorance but less than is required by individuals when pursuing the
goods for their lives. Another subtlety offered is that rational choice and
pursuit of the good are evolving or dynamic (organic), 84 whereas exercise
of the right is static.8 5 One final distinction initially suggested by Rawls is
that the exercise of rational choice and the pursuit of goods is compara-
78. Id. at 29.
79. Id. at 30.
80. Id. at 31.
81. Id. at 446.
82. Id. at 447-48.
83. Id. at 448-49.
84. I use the term "organic" in a sense similar to that used by ROBERT NOZICK, ANAR-
CHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 209 (1974).
85. RAwS, supra note 65, § 68.
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tive, that is, the seeking and choosing of goals rely on comparing and
contrasting diverse options. The exercise of the right is much more uni-
form. It is antithetical for the right to rely on comparisons; the rules or
principles of justice consist of an integrity that is opposed to variety. 86
But how strongly these distinctions can be followed presents several
major challenges to Rawls's initial views about the right being prior to the
good. Will Kymlicka has sifted through the questions posed by these dis-
tinctions and has provided a framework for answering them-a frame-
work which establishes why the good, why the virtuous is vital to
developing an understanding of justice and the system of justice with
which lawyers are inextricably involved. Kymlicka hastened to question
whether there is any real issue regarding the priority of one over the
other.87 Much of his criticism of Rawls was independently addressed by
Rawls himself when he, Rawls, recognized and examined several connec-
tions between the right and the good not previously made.
However, it will help to first address Kymlicka's critique of the initial
views of Rawls. Kymlicka maintains that the contrasts which Rawls pro-
posed in A Theory of Justice confuse rather than clarify the issues of the
right and the good. I propose to take Kymlicka's critique as a means of
sharpening rather than denying the points initially made by Rawls in 1971
concerning distinctions between the right and the good.
Kymlicka's first criticism argues that Rawls improperly conflated tele-
ology and utilitarianism since Rawls concluded that utilitarians ignore the
full moral significance of the distinctness of persons because they do not
account for the distinctness of persons.88 Kymlicka showed that Rawls
was mistaken in this view because what is at issue is not the distinction
between people and their individual claims, but the equality given to each
individual's claims in formulating principles of justice. Moreover, Kym-
licka convincingly argued that utilitarianism can be a deontological the-
ory which Rawls denied.89 Yet Rawls was concerned about a
fundamental level of equal consideration for each person, and this, argues
Kymlicka, is consistent with the political morality of utilitarianism as a
deontological theory of equal consideration. 90
Kymlicka directed his second criticism at Rawls's contrast pertaining to
a fair distribution of the good which is at the heart of justice-as-fairness.
Ultimately, Kymlicka advocates that the real distinction depends not on
distribution but on the "proper definition of the good."91 Since Rawls
avoided imposing a particular view of the good on people, his theory
leads to variety (the "thin theory of the good") in the goods people may
choose.92 This accords with Rawls's nonperfectionist theory of society
86. Id. § 84.
87. WILL KYMLICKA, LIBERALISM, COMMUNITY, AND CULTURE 21 (1991).
88. Id. at 32.
89. Id.
90. Id.




where he sees that essential human interests will be less limited and more
protected by nonperfectionism. Rawls believed that perfectionist theo-
ries are geared to goods (teleology) rather than principles (the right).
But this concern obscures an important as well as accurate understanding
of the nature and relationship of the right and the good.93 Kymlicka re-
ferred to Rawls's questionable position that perfectionists are primarily
concerned with maximizing "their preferred good. '94 Kymlicka demon-
strated how perfectionists and nonperfectionists do not simply adhere to
one basic view apiece. Just as there is variety among the views of
nonperfectionists, so there is variety of views among perfectionists. This
being the case, it is possible for both teleologists and deontologists to
pursue a variety of goals (goods). 95
As earlier mentioned, Kymlicka's critique must be reconsidered in light
of Rawls's 1980 article, The Priority of the Right and Ideas of the Good.96
While not responding directly to Kymlicka's objections, Rawls accounted
for some of his criticisms. Like Kymlicka, 97 Rawls discovered that the
right and the good may be more complementary than he originally sug-
gested in A Theory of Justice. While still remaining prior in Rawls's esti-
mation, the right is not completely sealed off from the good. Connections
between them can be observed on two levels: the first is through the
principles of justice themselves which influence the exercise of rational
choice and the goods pursued by individuals; the second is through the
constraints imposed by social and political institutions on the exercise of
rational choice. Rawls conceded that for the principles of justice to en-
hance liberty, the limits placed on the exercise of rational choice cannot
be too restrictive. 98
Although in A Theory of Justice Rawls made more of the distinction of
than the relationship between the right and the good, he subsequently
acknowledged a link between an individual's exercise of rational choice
and pursuit of the good and the constraints imposed on these choices by
the political and social institutions generated by the principles of justice.
But in making this connection, Rawls implicitly and paradoxically recog-
nized some further distinctions between the right and the good-an ac-
knowledgment that is vital to the virtuous lawyer. While Rawls
attempted to show how "admissible ideas of the good" respect the prior-
ity of the right and the political conception of justice,99 he identified sev-
eral distinctions which demonstrate dependence and relationship
between the two-a dependence which makes an important and, I sub-
mit, vital connection between justice and virtue.
93. Id. at 35.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. JOHN RAwLs, THE PRIORITY OF THE RIGHT AND IDEAS OF THE GOOD IN POLUT-
ICAL LIBERALISM 174 (1993).
97. KYMLICKA, supra note 87, at 21.
98. RAWLS, supra note 96, at 174.
99. Id. at 176.
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The first distinction focused on goodness as rationality. In targeting
their goals in life, individuals generally exercise rationality. But some ex-
ercises of rationality can restrict the specific aims identified by each per-
son. While an individual may reasonably desire a particular goal,
rationality ultimately cautions against some goals because they conflict
with the principles of justice or they may be prohibited by social and
political structures erected by the principles. This distinction emerges
more sharply when we see the difference between plain rational choice
versus rational choice that is subject to institutions which are conditioned
by the right. Plain rational choice can lead an individual to elect a partic-
ular good, but rational choice exercised in accordance with the right may
identify the selection as a good not worth pursuing or incapable of being
pursued because it conflicts with the principles of justice or their political
and social institutions.100 In itself, this distinction does not help the argu-
ment I am attempting to make. However, this is where the second dis-
tinction becomes significant.
The second distinction extends from the first and emerges from the
manner in which individuals select primary goods as contrasted with the
method used by citizens. Rawls distinguished between individuals (per-
sons who manifest little interest in their culture and society) and citizens
(persons, like the virtuous lawyer, who are or might be very concerned
about those with whom they share in a community of interdependent in-
dividuals). Both individuals and citizens exercise rational choice in the
identification and selection of primary goods. But individuals choose pri-
mary goods independently of any external factors including relationships
with those other persons with whom they share a community. Citizens,
on the other hand, choose them in accordance with the rights and duties
imposed by social and political institutions founded in accordance with
the justice principles. The person qua individual and the person qua citi-
zen do not operate under the same rational scheme for identifying pri-
mary goods. The citizen's selection of primary goods will necessarily be
influenced by those primary goods "advantageous for all" whereas the
individual would select primary goods without this influence. The ra-
tional choice which assists the citizen in selecting primary goods conse-
quently bears the hallmark of mutuality: what is good for one agent can
be good for other agents. This is absent in the exercise of rational choice
by the individual. Thus, the selection of primary goods by the citizen
bears a social component; that of the individual does not.' 0 '
The distinction between the individual and the citizen provides the
foundation for a further contrast between the good and the right. The
citizen-such as the lawyer-is a member of social and political institu-
tions. Lawyers who exercise rational choice in the selection of goods do
so in accordance with political virtues-"virtues of fair social cooperation
such as the virtues of civility and tolerance, of reasonableness and the
100. Id. at 176-78.
101. Id. at 178-90.
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sense of fairness."' 10 2 A citizen (such as the virtuous lawyer) is guided by
a sense of public virtue which permeates one's exercise of rational choice
with freedom, equality, and social cooperation; the individual, on the
other hand, does not rely on these virtues.'03
A critic of my interpretation might argue that these distinctions lead to
a perfectionist state (presumably inhabited and controlled by virtuous
people) to which Rawls is opposed.1°4 This objection can be countered
by the recognition of a further distinction which follows from the previ-
ous three.10 5 While citizens and individuals share an interest in seeking
goods, the concept of the good for the citizen implies the good for all.
The nexus between the good for one member and the other members of
the society raises the concept of the good of the political society which is
intertwined with the good of the citizen. This is where Rawls's final dis-
tinction concerning "the idea of the good of a well-ordered (political)
society" comes into play.' °6 These interrelated concepts do not necessi-
tate the ideal political community; they do, however, show that citizens
who exercise their rational choice do so for themselves and the well-or-
dered society. The point here is that citizens seek goods for themselves
and others which are not predetermined by principles but are determined
by a "social" rational choice that relies on the virtuous qualities of the
citizen.
As Rawls experienced an evolution in his belief about the priority of
the right over the good, he adopted a view acknowledging certain connec-
tion and compatibility between the two. The connection hinges on the
role of virtue in the life and action of the citizen. The question to be
addressed now is what do these distinctions mean about the relationship
between the right and the good? Is Rawls still correct in maintaining the
deontological priority once he admitted the connection between the two?
Or are the subsequent distinctions which he raised after he modified the
views contained in A Theory of Justice more cosmetic than substantive?
While the right and the good overlap in some areas, they are distin-
guishable in others. In the final analysis, the distinctions are better un-
derstood if seen as those of emphasis rather than separation. The
distinctions between the right and the good, while several, are of degree
rather than kind. As Kymlicka correctly pointed out, there is no real is-
sue "about which of the right and the good is prior.' 01 7 When the distinc-
tions between the two are analyzed, it becomes clear that the connections
and interrelationships between the good and the right outweigh the dif-
102. Id. at 194.
103. Id. at 190-95.
104. See STEPHEN MULHALL, LIBERALISM AND COMMUNITARIANS 32 (1992). This au-
thor takes this point further. He argues that liberals like Rawls who oppose perfectionism
present a view of social and political institutions which unite rather than separate people's
good with the right. As he states, "[Tialk about the priority of the right over the good only
serves to conceal this crucial point." Id.
105. RAWLS, supra note 96, at 201-06.
106. Id. at 201.
107. KYMLICKA, supra note 87, at 21.
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ferences. The right and the good, when all is said, are different but also
interdependent and complementary. The contrasts between the two are
of degree, not substance; they reveal as much about unity as they do
about separation. The virtuous citizen or lawyer who possesses and exer-
cises the virtues of wisdom, courage, compassion, and prudence will be
able to achieve justice in hard cases because of his recognition of not only
the distinction between the right and the good but also of their interde-
pendence as well.
B. WHAT IS CONSTITUTIVE OF THE VIRTUOUS LAWYER'S
LEGAL REASONING?
Of course, this last point raises the question about the role of morality
in the process leading up to making the just decision in hard cases. An-
other way of framing the issue is to determine the extent to which the
legal reasoning exercised by any lawyer is simply a technical function that
is pursued the same ways by the nonvirtuous lawyer as well as the virtu-
ous. But another set of questions surfaces: is it important to consider the
role which moral consideration plays in the search and implementation of
justice? Must moral considerations play a role in the reasoning process of
the lawyer as he seeks justice? The question takes on further significance
as one ponders the statement made by Robert George: "Laws cannot
make men moral. Only men can do that; and they can do it only by
freely choosing to do the morally right thing for the right reason."' 08
From what I have said so far, it would seem logical to argue that a
lawyer must incorporate moral considerations when he seeks the goal
(the good) of justice. It would also appear that the virtuous lawyer is a
moral reasoner who focuses on the good rather than simply the rule/right.
However, one commentator, John Finnis, has suggested that legal reason-
ing, in large part, is technical rather than moral reasoning.'0 9 This asser-
tion raises the issue about the separation between law and morals: is the
separation real and necessary, or is it a fiction and unnecessary? The
virtuous lawyer must find an answer to these questions. The virtuous law-
yer may well be acquainted with Ronald Dworkin's lawyer-judge Hercu-
les who is gifted with "superhuman skill, learning, patience, and
acumen."" 0 Unlike Hercules, the virtuous lawyer can make no claim to
being other than human. Of greater influence to the virtuous lawyer is
the model constructed by Judge Cardozo who argued that a conscientious
lawyer-judge is like the "wise pharmacist" who must balance and com-
bine a variety of ingredients including logic, history, custom, and a sense
of right in order to arrive at a just decision."' As the virtuous lawyer
searches for rational approaches to legal reasoning, he is aware of the
108. ROBERT GEORGE, MAKING MEN MORAL: CIVIL LIBERTIES AND PUBLIC MORAL-
rry 1 (1993).
109. John Finnis, Natural Law and Legal Reasoning, in NATURAL LAW THEORY: CON-
TEMPORARY ESSAYS 134, 142 (Robert George ed., 1992).
110. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 105-06 (1978).
111. BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 162 (1921).
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contributions made by positivism and natural law. But when confronted
with Finnis's statement, the virtuous lawyer is perplexed. Is Finnis really
claiming that moral reasoning has little part in legal reasoning and the
legal process? Realizing that Finnis's concept of practical reasonableness
underlies legal reasoning by raising the fundamental moral issue about
what ought to be done, 112 the virtuous lawyer concludes that there is
more to Finnis's statement.
As a conscientious person, the virtuous lawyer considers that he must
participate in difficult cases which defy easy solution. What the virtuous
lawyer must do initially is apply a corpus of relevant judicial precedent
and other authority such as statutes and regulations to each case. Some
of this work is technical, perhaps even mechanical in the application of
relevant precedent and other authorities to each factual context. But this
does not preclude probing the moral issues within difficult cases. Unlike
Dworkin's Judge Hercules who searches for one right answer," 3 the vir-
tuous lawyer acknowledges that there may well be several viable solu-
tions (several appropriate answers) for difficult cases. The question
which the virtuous lawyer must address, then, is what considerations must
be pursued to ascertain the better solutions among these viable alterna-
tives? While the virtuous lawyer questions Hercules's claim of one right
answer, he also wonders whether there is more to legal reasoning than is
suggested in Finnis's quotation. Surely legal reasoning cannot simply be
an exercise in which rules are mechanically applied to difficult cases. If
this were so, reasonable lawyers would be able to find solutions based on
technical rules before the difficult cases ever get to court.
The virtuous lawyer notes the disagreement between Finnis and Dwor-
kin: there simply cannot be one "right" answer to hard cases." 4 What
makes cases like Plessy, Dred Scott, and Korematsu hard is that they es-
tablished harsh precedents which were law that "had" to be followed un-
til altered or reversed. Indeed, Finnis acknowledges that there is more to
adjudication and the legal process than technical reasoning. While the
reasoning process which lawyers and judges must follow is, in part
mechanical or technical, it does not preclude an investigation about the
important moral questions that often permeate hard cases (like those of
112. FiNis, supra note 33, at 12.
113. RONALD DWORKIN, LAWS EMPIRE 257-58 (1986). Dworkin elaborates upon his
"one right answer" thesis in Chapter 5 of RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE
(1979). Dworkin introduces Hercules in his Taking Rights Seriously, where he describes his
mythical judge as follows:
[A] lawyer of superhuman skill, learning, patience and acumen... [who] is a
judge of some representative American jurisdiction. . . . [Hercules] accepts
the main uncontroversial constitutive and regulative rules of the law in his
jurisdiction. He accepts ... that statutes have the general power to create
and extinguish legal rights, and that judges have the general duty to follow
earlier decisions of their court or higher courts whose rationale, as lawyers
say, extends to the case at bar.
DWORK[N, supra note 110, at 105-06.
114. Finnis, supra note 109, at 143-44.
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Dred Scott, Plessy, and Korematsu).115 The virtuous lawyer is convinced
that it is precisely in the hard cases where moral reasoning is often neces-
sary to reach justice. Finnis conceded that moral investigation is a com-
ponent of the legal and judicial processes: it is the "backbone" of legal
reasoning, and it helps shape the enterprise. 116 The search for objective
moral truth is vital to deciding hard cases because this investigation is
constitutive of ascertaining "the most basic human rights." 117 In the final
analysis, Finnis recognized a logical nexus between addressing moral is-
sues and legal reasoning. This connection becomes evident when the vir-
tuous lawyer discovers that identification of the moral is rationally
determined. This connection becomes increasingly manifest as judges
and advocates become more deeply involved with legal reasoning.
The virtuous lawyer is puzzled by Finnis's suggestion that legal reason-
ing is largely technical rather than moral because of Finnis's acknowledg-
ment of the connection between morality and law. What furthers justice
and human flourishing (two concepts of great importance to Finnis) can-
not be determined by exclusive reliance on technical reasoning. Justice
and human flourishing must ultimately incorporate "a principle of fair-
ness" based not on a separation but rather a synthesis of legal and moral
reasoning.118 For Finnis, reason deprived of moral consideration will
never in itself determine what is just, what is the "greater good and lesser
evil."'119 The virtuous lawyer can be satisfied that the question raised by
Finnis is rhetorical, but he also wonders if there are other explanations
about the separation of and connection between law and morals.
Jeremy Waldron has presented a useful inquiry into the relevance of
moral issues to legal reasoning. Waldron formulated his investigation by
raising questions about the relevance of moral realism to legal decision
making. Ultimately, he saw that any link between the moral and the legal
is specious, and he concluded that moral decision making by lawyers and
judges is inappropriate. 20 Waldron has also criticized Dworkin's belief
that Hercules can find one right answer to hard cases. But Waldron's
reasons differ from those of Finnis in large part due to his argument that
moral discourse is riddled with subjective indeterminacy such that it can-
not effectively contribute to the judicial process and the legal reasoning.
The gist of Waldron's complaint is that lawyers and judges who claim to
arrive at moral decisions often arrive at different decisions which conflict
with the claims of others who also believe that their conclusions are
moral.121 In the final analysis, it is not the lawyer's or judge's moral sub-
jectivity that Waldron sees as being fatal to moral claims; rather, it is the
115. Id. at 142.
116. Id. at 148.
117. Id.
118. As Finnis argues, "moral absolutes give legal reasoning its backbone" and "moral
absolutes are rationally determined." Id.
119. Id. at 151-52.
120. Jeremy Waldron, The Irrelevance of Moral Objectivity, in NATURAL LAW THEORY:
CONTEMPORARY ESSAYS, supra note 109, at 163.
121. Id. at 183-84.
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disagreement among the variety of conflicting moral claims that lawyers
can and do make.122 The virtuous lawyer can appreciate Waldron's cri-
tique and contribution, but he is troubled by the strength of his opposi-
tion, perhaps even hostility, to the claim that there is a connection
between law and morals. Even H. L. A. Hart implied some "point of
necessary intersection between law and morals" when he critiqued the
utilitarians' "emphatic insistence" on the separation of law and morals in
legal reasoning. 123
Robert Alexy presented a counterpoint to the views of Waldron when
he argued that there is a conceptually necessary connection between law
and morality. He contended that individual legal norms and decisions,
along with entire legal systems, connect law and morality through their
respective claims to correctness. 24 In other words, legal concepts neces-
sarily possess an ideal component which links the law with a procedural
and universal morality. Unfortunately, Alexy's argument is somewhat
circular: he attempts to refute the positivist's claim which denies "any
conceptually necessary connection between law and morality on an ana-
lytical level" with what he claims to be the nonpositivist argument "that
there is no conceptually necessary connection between law and morality
whatsoever."' 25 Alexy's goal of identifying connection through the mu-
tual claim of correctness made by law and morality is inviting, but his
circular argument of using a negative to disprove a negative is
cumbersome.
The virtuous lawyer may turn to the evaluation of the moral compo-
nent of legal reasoning made by Neil MacCormick who has retreated
from his earlier attraction to "the separation of law and morals" thesis.
MacCormick has spanned the gap between the moral and the legal gener-
ated by Waldron's thesis when he identified a "necessary connection" be-
tween law and morality that avoided his previous detection. 26 This
nexus is manifested in those legal systems which aspire to just decisions.
The reasoning leading to just decisions tends to rely on compromise be-
tween and tolerance of the respective positions of the parties to the legal
dispute. This connection between law and morals, while weak, is still sig-
nificant for MacCormick. 127 But it is also practical because law and mo-
rality share concerns about how individuals-and lawyers who represent
these individuals in hard cases-must ultimately live together in soci-
122. Id. at 184.
123. H. L. A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, reprinted in H. L.
A. HART, ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY 49, 64 (1983). But see Lon L.
Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARv. L. REV. 630
(1958), for Professor Fuller's response which develops an inextricable relationship between
law and morality.
124. Robert Alexy, On Necessary Relations Between Law and Morality, 6 RATIO JURIS
167, 168-69 (1989).
125. Id. at 170 (emphasis added).
126. Neil MacCormick, Natural Law and the Separation of Law and Morals, in NATU-
RAL LAW THEORY: CONTEMPORARY ESSAYS, supra note 109, at 113.
127. Id. at 118.
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ety.128 Like the virtuous lawyer, MacCormick saw the promising link be-
tween morality and law in their mutual, practical interests to resolve
conflict and to establish a just result.129 The quest for a just result sug-
gests the existence and necessity of a legal order in the human community
called the Rule of Law. What bolsters the Rule of Law for both Mac-
Cormick and the virtuous lawyer is found in the consensus that the Rule
must be practically oriented toward an efficiency that is fair, determinate,
good, and just.130 The virtuous lawyer realizes that if the Rule of Law is
not geared to this efficiency, individuals in conflict may turn to alternative
methods of resolving their disputes which avoid the elements of practical
reasoning shared by law and morals.
While MacCormick's approach contains promise, the virtuous lawyer
searches for a clearer presentation of just how the moral and the legal
come together in the legal reasoning that must be the "backbone" of his
exercise of the judicial process. Joseph Raz has supplied assistance with
his argument that legal reasoning is reasoning which either signifies what
the law is or suggests how legal disputes "should" be resolved consistent
with the law.13' The appeal of Raz's view is that it is not restricted to how
"ideal" lawyers (such as Dworkin's Hercules) approach the law and legal
reasoning; it is a process which reasonable persons concerned with the
law can accept and implement. 32
The core of Raz's argument identifying and explaining the connection
between legal and moral reasoning concentrates on the question: How,
when all (not just legal) matters are considered, should cases be decided?
Raz carefully distinguishes this "law-plus" investigation which he claims
to be a moral one from the "law-only" issue. For Raz, the question
"How, according to the law, should cases be decided?" is not necessarily
a moral question. 33 This distinction suggests that morality is a back-
ground consideration which lawyers should resort to as a function of be-
ing rational agents. As one thinks about resolution of a legal dispute,
human reflection will engage a variety of values, some of which are
moral.' 34 The virtuous lawyer is attracted to considering the Razian
scheme to assess (1) whether legal reasoning raises moral questions and
(2) whether it can be modified or reformed because of moral objections.
Reinforcing the attractions of this scheme is the virtuous lawyer's ac-
knowledgment that the law and legal reasoning are human institutions
128. Id.
129. Id. at 120. In his earlier work, MacCormick noted that moral reasoning is not a
"poor relation of legal reasoning." Id at 272. Rather, he insisted that "legal reasoning is a
special, highly institutionalized and formalized type of moral reasoning." Id. For Mac-
Cormick, the legal and the moral necessarily share parts of the same social setting. NEIL
MACCORMICK, LEGAL REASONING AND LEGAL THEORY 272-74 (1978).
130. GEORGE, supra note 108, at 121-25.
131. Joseph Raz, On the Autonomy of Legal Reasoning, 6 RATIO JURIs 2 (1993).
132. Id. at 2-3.
133. Id. at 3.
134. Id at 5.
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and therefore not above or beyond moral evaluation.135
Although the virtuous lawyer does not automatically assume a connec-
tion between law and morality, neither does he view the law and legal
reasoning as hermetically sealed from moral considerations and moral
reasoning. This is a crucial distinction which should be considered in as-
sessing the traditional Benthamite and Austinian views about the separa-
tion of law and morals. 136 Raz avoids Alexy's vulnerable necessary
connection argument by acknowledging a body of technical legal rules
which range in degrees of independence from moral considerations. At
the same time, Raz further acknowledges the existence of a second
corpus of law (distinct from technical rules) which is subject to varying
degrees of moral evaluation and reasoning.' 37
But the skeptic may raise another objection to the argument that there
is a nexus between legal and moral reasoning. If a portion of the law is
independent of and autonomous from moral reasoning, can this segment
be expanded to demonstrate that most legal cases involving disputes be-
tween people can be decided without any need for moral reasoning? The
virtuous lawyer must answer this question in the negative. The technical
considerations which insulate some aspects of legal reasoning from moral
evaluation cannot be applied to the substantive issues of human conflict
which emerge in the disputes that are at the core of legal cases. Other-
wise, this would lead to a mechanical jurisprudence which is ill-suited for
resolving these difficult issues where moral reasoning is essential. In
these cases, the facts, the equity of the parties' positions, and other rele-
vant considerations would be overshadowed and perhaps even eliminated
by this mechanical approach to legal reasoning. Like the Cardozian ju-
rist,138 the virtuous lawyer does not think that Raz endorses such an ap-
proach. While Raz does not make the point directly, the virtuous lawyer
develops Raz's approach in the assumption that litigants and their legal
representatives are rational and reasonable. If this assumption is correct,
then the conflict about the meaning of the law in each case is usually not
a disagreement between illogical or irrational persons, but rather is be-
tween rational and logical ones. Notwithstanding their rationality, the lit-
igants disagree over the meaning of the law as it applies to their dispute.
The virtuous lawyer sees that the law itself does not contain an internal
mechanism that automatically resolves the disagreement between these
rational agents. But the law has been established by people as the body
of general rules to guide and regulate how they live together. Conse-
quently, the virtuous lawyer must expand the reasoning about the mean-
ing of the law in such cases, and reliance on background moral
considerations essential to how these people can restore the ability to live
135. Id. at 6.
136. Hart, supra note 123, at 50.




in right relationship with one another may be necessary for just resolution
of interpersonal disputes.
Ultimately, the virtuous lawyer sees that legal and moral reasoning are
not separate enterprises. While some legal reasoning is not based on
moral reasoning (particularly when the questions focus on technical mat-
ters such as general procedure), this does not automatically lead to the
conclusion "that legal reasoning is impervious to moral reasons. '139
Although moral reasoning need not permeate the entire process of legal
reasoning, neither is it completely absent from the process. A strict sepa-
ration of law and morals is a doctrine which has little bearing on the law-
yer's contribution to the legal process. Especially in those difficult cases
where reasonable people credibly argue conflicting understandings about
the meaning of the law, the virtuous lawyer concludes that what clarifies
the meaning of the law in such a context is the background consideration
of its moral justification. While reasonable people, including reasonable
lawyers, may dispute what is the particular moral justification reinforcing
the meaning of the law, there is considerably less disagreement that it is a
moral justification which underlies our understanding of the law and the
legal reasoning which supplies that understanding in hard cases. But
when we get to the hardest of cases and the moral and virtuous lawyer
seems to be boxed in by what the law demands, must the virtuous lawyer
disobey the law in order to remain virtuous?
C. DOES THE VIRTUOUS LAWYER ALWAYS HAVE A DUTY TO OBEY
THE LAW?
There has been much discussion about whether there is an obligation to
obey the law or not.140 The question presented here presumes that there
is some obligation on the part of the virtuous lawyer to obey; related to
this question is the issue regarding the extent to which this obligation is
voluntary. Assuming that some aspects of obedience to the law are
mandatory and others are voluntary, how does any obligation to obey the
law affect the positions and actions taken by the virtuous lawyer? Philip
Soper claims that there is a weak obligation to obey the law in that there
is "some moral reason to do what the law requires.' 4' The obligation to
obey, for Soper, is neither absolute nor irrefutable but prima facie. There
can be substantive reasons for not obeying an unjust law or not obeying a
139. Id. at 14.
140. Another commentator has investigated and developed the relationship between
the responsibility of citizenship and obligation due the law. See T.R.S. Allan, Citizenship
and Obligation: Civil Disobedience and Civil Dissent, 55 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 89 (1996), where
the author argues that legal obligations must be understood in the context of moral judg-
ment. According to Professor Allan, whether a person obeys the law or not is based on a
premise that the citizen (presumably this would include the lawyer) will obey the law upon
his judgment concerning the law's "purposes and effects." Id. at 119. For Allan, the rela-
tionship between obedience and disobedience is contingent on the moral basis of the law
that appeals to reason rather than the threat of the exercise of force. Id.
141. Philip Soper, The Obligation to Obey the Law, in ISSUES IN CONTEMPORARY
LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 127, 132 (Ruth Gavison ed., 1987).
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just law in particular circumstances where obedience would constitute in-
justice. 142 Nonetheless, two points reinforce Soper's claim that there is a
moral reason to obey the law. The first is that law is part of a "supremely
effective coercive system" that offers its subjects both security and an at-
tractive alternative to the chaos of anarchy; second, the law is defended
by its subjects who are the frequent beneficiaries of its ability to coordi-
nate social life and by those whose duty it is to enforce the law.143 But is
the obligation to obey the law always voluntary? Does the concept of
voluntariness imply that the action pursued by an individual is done
freely and intentionally and not mandated by some coercive authority? 1'
It is important to answer these questions in order to assess what position
the virtuous lawyer must take in hard cases where the law is either im-
moral or, if it is not, would dictate a result which is not moral or would
achieve an unjust result.
In order to address these issues, it will be helpful to determine what is
meant by legal obligation within the context of law and obedience to law.
A brief examination of the positions taken by several major contributors
to this discussion will frame the investigation. One of the first definitions
about legal obligation was offered by Socrates in the Crito dialogue. Soc-
rates had been condemned to die because of his violation of Athenian
law. But Crito offered Socrates a tempting alternative to death, tempting
because contained within the plan for escape was the argument that diso-
bedience to the law would be morally justified in this case. Socrates
demonstrated in the Apology that the allegations he faced were unsub-
stantiated and that the law as applied to Socrates was unjust. 45 Crito
informed Socrates that his escape could be arranged by payment of a
small sum of money. However, Socrates responded that even though he
may be wrongly convicted, it would be a greater wrong to take the law
into his own hands by escaping from lawfully imposed punishment. For
Socrates, the injustice done to him paled in contrast to the violence he
would commit against the state by escaping punishment for the unjustifi-
able conviction. Socrates was committed to the covenantal nature of the
law: the citizen once having agreed to the law is bound to it in its en-
tirety, and it would be improper to avoid any of its provisions. The cove-
nants of his day (ancient Biblical or suzerainty treaties) were reciprocal in
that they established a voluntary bond between the lord and the vassal,
each promising to do something for the other.146 In such covenants, the
142. Aquinas argues in Summa Theologiae that not all human law binds people "in
conscience" when such law contravenes God's law, especially where the human law "in-
flicts unjust hurt on its subjects." AoUINAS, supra note 16, at Ia-Ilae, Q. 96, art. 4.
143. Soper, supra note 141, at 153.
144. Joseph Raz, Promises and Obligations, in LAW, MORALrrY AND SOcIETY 218, 223
(P. M. S. Hacker & Joseph Raz eds., 1977).
145. Plato, Apology, reprinted in GREAT DIALOGUES OF PLATO 442 (Eric H. Warm-
ington & Philip G. Rouse eds. & W.H.D. Rouse trans., 1956).
146. THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH 353 (F. L. Cross & E. A.
Livingstone eds., 2d ed. 1974). See also JOSEPH BLENKINSOPP, WISDOM AND LAW IN THE
OLD TESTAMENT 103 (1995), for further explanation of the mutual and reciprocal relation-
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relationship between the parties is characterized by rights and obligations
flowing in both directions.147
Richard Wasserstrom redefined the question faced by Socrates in his
investigation of "the obligation" to obey the law. He reconstructed the
question which Socrates faced by testing the claim: "because one does
have an obligation to obey the law, one ought not ever disobey the
law."'1 48 Wasserstrom identified the falsehood of assuming that a person
has an absolute obligation to obey the law because he demonstrated that
there are circumstances which can justify disobedience (such as the case
involving the false charges against Socrates). Wasserstrom challenged
Socrates's view by claiming that even if one begins with a prima facie
obligation to obey, disobedience can be morally justified when strict ad-
herence to the law constitutes greater violence to justice than obedience.
His point reflects Rawls's view that, while there is a moral obligation (de-
rived from the principle of fairness) to obey the law, such obligation can
be overcome by other obligations. 149 The nucleus of Wasserstrom's posi-
tion is his concern "with moral obligations and morally justified ac-
tions."' 50 Writing at the time of widespread civil rights demonstrations
protesting the evil of segregation, Wasserstrom argued that it is not "in-
consistent to assert both that indiscriminate disobedience is indefensible
and that discriminate disobedience is morally right and proper.'
151
Given the context in which he was writing, the author did not advocate
unbridled disobedience; he did advocate, however, that disobedience to
oppressive laws directly or indirectly disfavoring some citizens over
others could be morally justified. But Wasserstrom did not address the
question whether the obligation to obey the law is voluntary when he
stated that he is "not at all concerned with the question of why, in fact, so
many people do obey the law."'1 52 Insight about the voluntary nature of
obedience to the law must be sought elsewhere.
M.B.E. Smith advanced the bold view that not only is there no obvious
obligation to obey the law, there is no prima facie obligation to obey any
laws of one's government. 153 Smith defined a prima facie obligation as
one in which a person has a moral reason to obey the law.154 Absent
ship between the suzerain and the vassal. For a further view of the relationship between
the Biblical Wisdom literature and legal authority, see Bernard T. Jackson, Modeling Bibli-
cal Law: The Covenant Code, 70 CH.-KENT L. REv. 1745 (1995).
147. THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE BIBLE 139 (Bruce M. Metzger & Michael D.
Coogan eds., 1993). Interestingly, Joseph Raz implies a connection between covenantal
relationship and the political notion of obedience to law when he noted that an obligation
to obey can be "the result of a special relationship between and individual and his state."
See RAZ, supra note 35, at 104.
148. Richard A. Wasserstrom, The Obligation to Obey the Law, 10 UCLA L. REV. 780,
782 (1963).
149. RAwLs, supra note 65, §§ 52, 53.
150. Wasserstrom, supra note 148, at 785.
151. Id. at 793.
152. Id. at 785.
153. M.B.E. Smith, Is There a Prima Facie Obligation to Obey the Law?, 82 YALE L.J.
950 (1973).
154. Id. at 951.
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some other moral reason which would take precedence over the first to
obey the law, a failure to obey the law would be wrong. In Smith's view
(which is in sharp contrast with Soper's), debts of gratitude to one's gov-
ernment for supplying basic services and security are insufficient to im-
pose a prima facie obligation to obey. Any argument from fair play
(which both Hart and Rawls support 155) is not directed toward the obli-
gation to obey as much as it is directed toward guiding one's relationships
with fellow citizens. In addition, offering one's consent to the presence
and operation of a government is not a prima facie obligation to obey the
law. Smith correctly pointed out that virtually every legal system con-
tains either pointless or harmful laws to which citizen's obedience would
be either meaningless or detrimental; therefore, avoidance of and possi-
bly disobedience to such laws in some circumstances would be the mor-
ally correct thing to do.156
While there may be many harmful or pointless laws, there are many
others which are either beneficial or neutral in their outcome. Smith ap-
pears to agree with Aquinas in stating that some types of disobedience
(e.g., against immoral laws) can be morally justified. However, it would
be mistaken to conclude that it would always be morally justifiable to
ignore or disobey the law, particularly when the law's enforcement is
based on moral grounds or when the law generates substantive benefits
for all humanity. Moreover, many laws are crucial to coordinating the
events of daily life (e.g., most traffic regulations) and obeying them would
not be unjust-particularly in an urban setting during rush-hour traffic.157
Tony Honor6 has offered an important supplement to the discussion.
While not answering whether the obligation to obey is voluntary, he ad-
dressed the question why individuals should obey the law. He advanced a
political argument why there is an obligation to obey: obedience to law is
"healthy" because it makes members of a society more mindful that they
are conditionally dependent on one another.'58 While Honor6 did not
dismiss the existence of circumstances which can morally justify disobedi-
ence, his position agreed with Soper's that there is a general prima facie
obligation to obey. The prima facie obligation is premised on the exist-
ence of myriad complexities found in contemporary life. Honord argued
that because of these complexities, sensible individuals must depend on
the existence, implementation, and enforcement of the laws which help
people meet these complexities. Putting aside the acknowledgment that
the law serves many practical human needs, he did not reach the second
155. H. L. A. Hart, Are There Any Natural Rights, in POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 62(Anthony Quinton ed., 1967); RAWLS, supra note 65, § 53; John Rawls Legal Obligation
and the Duty of Fair Play, in LAW AND PHILOSOPHY: A SYMPOSIUM 9-10 (Sidney Hook ed.,
1964).
156. Smith, supra note 153, at 956.
157. My example of the urban setting could take on a different hue if one were to
consider whether a motorist ought to obey all traffic regulations in the dead of night when
no other motorists are observed using the streets.
158. Tony Honord, Must We Obey? Necessity as a Ground of Obligation, 67 VA. L.
REV. 39, 44 (1981).
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component of the question-is the obligation voluntary? Honor6 im-
plied that the obligation is not voluntary. He concluded that the obliga-
tion to obey is of necessity rather than choice because people are
dependent on one another.159 In his view, people obey the law out of
practical necessity.
John Mackie offered an interesting thesis worth considering in the
search for defining the degree to which obeying the law is voluntary. His
investigation focused on inventing an obligation to obey the law, since in
his view, it is impossible to derive an obligation to obey the law.' 60 This
position in and of itself is not particularly helpful in answering the issue,
but Mackie identifies an idea that directs us to an answer. In his re-exam-
ination of the Crito, he reminds us that Socrates's action was voluntary. 161
Socrates was confronted with a difficult decision which he and Crito
viewed differently. The conflicting views of Socrates and Crito illustrate
that there can be and often is no strong consensus about how a reason-
able, generally law abiding individual should respond to the obligations
and responsibilities contained in the law. Mackie understood that reason-
able people (this presumably excludes anarchists and hermits who have
little or no use for law) "differ in the strength they assign, in a given legal
system, to the obligation to obey the law .... " 162 But Mackie did not
address whether the obedience is coerced, urged through peer pressure,
or voluntary. Joseph Raz comes the closest in addressing the gap left by
Mackie and is the author who is the most helpful in answering the
question.
Raz initially held a position similar to Smith's that not only is there no
obligation to obey the law, there is not even a prima facie obligation to
obey it.163 However, Raz made two concessions: (1) some people may
have moral reasons for obedience; and (2) most people have good pru-
dential reasons for obedience most of the time.164 Raz's two concessions
imply two conclusions. The first is that some people have individual rea-
sons based on moral or prudential judgment for obeying the law. The
second conclusion which follows is that such compliance is voluntary
rather than mandatory. Raz subsequently cautioned that his denial (i.e.,
there is no obligation to obey the law) does not mean that people should
disobey the law nor does it imply that it is immaterial whether individuals
obey or disobey. 165 In order to make his position more clear, Raz ex-
amined the concept of consent as the relationship between individual and
the authority which enacts the law. Within the context of contemporary
political institutions having a myriad of rules potentially or actually regu-
159. Id. at 61.
160. J. L. Mackie, Obligations to Obey the Law, 67 VA. L. REV. 143, 144 (1981).
161. Id. at 158.
162. Id.
163. JOSEPH RAz, THE AUTHORrrY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALITY 233
(1979).
164. Id. at 237, 242.
165. Joseph Raz, Authority and Consent, 67 VA. L. REV. 103, 104 (1981).
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lating people's lives, Raz's notion of consent is a sensible manner of in-
vestigating if obedience is voluntary or otherwise.
First, Raz regarded "consent" as a cognitive agreement which acknowl-
edges a change in the normative situation of a person; second, consent
eventually imposes the performance of action which demonstrates the
normative change; third, consent has a public element in which the indi-
vidual who offers the consent holds out to others (usually members of the
same political society) the first two conditions. 166 Yet, Raz's notion of
consent is not an inviolable rule which always binds people to obey. If
the society is just and a person tends to identify with this society, then it is
morally permissible for that person "to adopt an attitude of conscientious
watchfulness" in which obedience is not performance of an obligation but
exercise of a person's moral judgment that this is what ought to be
done. 167
Guiding Raz's investigation of the relationship between individuals and
the law is the issue of whether the law is itself morally justified. The
question about whether there is any obligation to obey cannot be an-
swered according to Raz until it is established that the law itself is morally
grounded. Only then can one like the virtuous lawyer assess the person's
moral obligation to obey.168 It would seem that the stronger the moral
justification for a law, the more a moral person is obligated to obey it; in
turn, the weaker the moral justification, the less one is obliged to honor
it. Because individuals are moral agents who often have different, per-
sonal decisions to make, the extent of any obligation to obey will vary
from person to person. 169
Raz takes issue with John Finnis's contentions that (1) the law is a
seamless web and (2) individuals cannot pick and choose which laws they
will obey and those they will not. 70 Reasons for following or not follow-
ing the law, according to Raz, tend to be individual, based on the moral
justifications of the law and the circumstances (including moral ones) of
each individual in relation to each law. Some individuals may also be
more concerned about or more affected by some laws and less concerned
with or less affected by others. This leads Raz to identify "an attitude of
respect" for the law which is founded not on an obligation to obey the
rules established and enforced by the authority but on the premises that
the law is one's law because it is either (1) the law which one has respect
for or consents to through "voluntary or semi-voluntary obligations"' 7'
or (2) the law of the community to which one belongs and identifies. 172
166. Id at 119-20.
167. Id. at 130-31.
168. Joseph Raz, The Obligation to Obey: Revision and Tradition, 1 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETmics & PUB. POL'Y 139, 140 (1984).
169. Id. at 146.
170. John Finnis, The Authority of Law in the Predicament of Contemporary Social The-
ory, 1 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHics & PUB. POL'Y 115, 120 (1984).
171. RAz, supra note 35, at 99.
172. Raz, supra note 168, at 154.
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Rather than having an obligation to obey, one has a relationship to the
community-the source of all law-which grows as one's identification
with it grows. This is akin to the "organic relationship" or covenant be-
tween a person and his community. 173 What emerges is a quasi-obliga-
tion to obey not so much the law as "one's attitude toward the
community" to which a person belongs. As Raz states, "[I]f there is a
general obligation to obey the law, it exists because it was voluntarily
undertaken" as a result of a person joining and remaining with the com-
munity. 174 Surely, a person living in a totalitarian state may follow the
law because of the harsh consequences of not doing so. But even here,
there is a sense of voluntariness when a person's prudent judgment and
realization about the practical considerations associated with obedience
and disobedience influence his decision.
However, when looking at democratic states and the societies in which
they exist, the story is somewhat different in that the voluntary nature of
citizen obedience is more characteristic of the political institutions. The
stronger the bond with the community (and its law), the stronger the vol-
untary obligation to be obedient to its rules; the less one identifies one's
self with the community, the weaker becomes that voluntary obligation.
But what about the virtuous lawyer?
In the context of the virtuous lawyer, it is not simply a free spirit which
autonomously decides whether to obey a particular law or to obey any
law in a particular context. Rather it is the virtuous lawyer as moral rea-
soner who seeks the good and looks at the law through the lens of virtue.
As mentioned in the earlier discussion on whether legal reasoning is
moral reasoning, the law consists of those rules simultaneously used by
each person along with the community at large to direct how people live
in peaceful coexistence with one another. When the law is not used to
achieve this goal of ensuring that the members of the society live in right
relation with one another, the duty or obligation to obey these rules may
be questioned since the law's existence and application are directed to-
ward achieving the good for all is in doubt. The virtuous lawyer first of
all understands the meaning of the law through the lenses of teleology,
moral reasoning, and the virtues of courage, compassion, wisdom, pru-
dence, and justice. Relying on this calculus, the virtuous lawyer's deter-
mination on whether the law is to be obeyed or not is guided by objective
moral reasoning, the good for both the community and the individual,
and application of the virtues.
VI. THE VIRTUOUS LAWYER AT WORK:
SEVERAL PARADIGMS
At this stage, I should like to take this concept of the virtuous lawyer
and give it more concrete definition. In doing so, I rely on the foundation
173. RAZ, supra note 35, at 104.
174. Raz, supra note 168, at 155.
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that lawyers (1) should understand the distinction as well as the connec-
tion between the right and the good; (2) respect those aspects of the law
which depend on moral reasoning; and (3) appreciate the interrelation-
ship between obedience and disobedience to the law. I shall begin to
develop the paradigm of the virtuous lawyer from Aquinas's discussion
on the virtues of justice and prudence. 175 Aquinas authored a discourse
on law as well as an investigation of prudence and justice. Both offer
relevant insights on contemporary social and legal issues which have
great bearing on the investigation of the virtuous lawyer.
In the Prima Secundae of his Summa Theologiae, Aquinas presented
his general theory of law. He defined law as rules or measures of acts
whereby individuals are induced to act or are restrained from acting. 176
His concept of the law helps establish the ground from which the investi-
gation of the virtuous lawyer will develop and take shape. Aquinas ac-
knowledged that law is generally directed toward the common good of
mankind.' 77 This basic point established a goal or the teleological di-
mension of the law which, as I have indicated earlier, is important to the
virtuous lawyer. Aquinas further identified the several kinds of law as
eternal, divine, natural, and human.' 78 The eternal law179 is teleological
and concerns God's plan of divine wisdom directing all things to the at-
tainment of their end.180 The divine law is related to the eternal law in
that it directs the last end of people and orders what they ought to do or
avoid, judges interior human movements, and punishes those evil deeds
which human law cannot or does not punish.' 8' Human law is the deriva-
tive of practical reason which directs the human race to known or knowa-
ble principles applicable to matters of human conduct.' 8 2 But these
descriptions and definitions of the law do not give the virtuous lawyer
substantive knowledge about the particulars of the law. Rather, they pro-
vide the virtuous lawyer with the ability to reflect upon what the law
ought to be in a broad way.
Dean Anthony Kronman has acknowledged an important contempo-
rary role for practical reasoning or wisdom which is central to Aquinas's
definition of human law. While acknowledging the strong skepticism
175. Throughout my discussion, it might be useful to keep in mind Alasdair Maclntyre's
definition of virtue as "an acquired human quality the possession and exercise of which
tends to enable us to achieve those goods which are internal to practices and the lack of
which effectively prevents us from achieving any such goods." MACINTYRE, supra note 15,
at 191. It would also be helpful to consider the advice MacIntyre gives on how the virtues
of prudence and justice differ: "Prudence is both an exercise of reason and concerned with
how reason should operate in practice. Justice is an application of reason to conduct and is
concerned with how the will may be rationally directed toward right conduct." ALASDAIR
MACINTYRE, WHOSE JUSTICE? WHICH RATIONALITY? 197 (1988).
176. AQUINAS, supra note 16, at Ia-IIae, Q. 90, art. 1.
177. Id. at Ia-IIae, Q. 90, art. 2, ad 1.
178. Id. at Ia-IIae, Q. 91.
179. Id. at Ia-IIae, Q. 91, art. 1.
180. F. C. COPLESTON, S.J., AQUINAS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LIFE AND WORK OF
THE GREAT MEDIEVAL THINKER 211 (1955).
181. AQUINAS, supra note 16, at Ia-IIae, Q. 91, art. 4.
182. Id. at Ia-IIae, Q. 91, art. 3.
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against practical wisdom in both legal education and the profession, Dean
Kronman asserts that "practicing lawyers still need the intellectual and
affective powers whose combination constitutes the virtue of practical
wisdom. '183 As he further notes, practical wisdom is a character trait of
what he calls the "lawyer-statesman" need to guide the lawyer in difficult
deliberations essential to doing the good of serving both the client and
society.184 This notion of doing good emerges elsewhere in the thought
of legal and political philosophers who understand the significance of vir-
tue to human life.
In drawing from Aquinas, Etienne Gilson suggested that the first and
foremost principle of legal prescriptions which humans know is that they
are to do good and avoid evil.185 Gilson's understanding reflects Aqui-
nas's point that the law provides one vehicle through which human rea-
son can discern what is good and what is evil.'8 6 The frequently cited
passage of the First Principle-that is, do good, avoid evil-makes the
point by stating that: "[T]he primary precept of the law is that good
should be done and pursued, and evil avoided; and on this are founded all
the other precepts of the law and nature."' 87
While this definition and discussion of law does not give the virtuous
lawyer much knowledge about the substantive content of the law and
how this content can and should be used to address and resolve the dis-
agreements found amongst members of the community it serves, it does
give a direction and a general methodology of developing and applying
law. As Charles Nemeth has pointed out, the Thomistic understanding
and explanation of law as offering a guide in moral matters is "a far more
flexible avenue than popularly conceived."' 88 Nemeth's careful study of
Aquinas's understanding of the meaning of law demonstrates that indi-
viduals who turn to the Thomistic notion "looking for recipes, indicia of
conduct, a lexicon of moral decisions, will be sorely disappointed.' ' 89
Aquinas did not provide answers to hard legal questions. Rather, he con-
structed a methodology to pursue answers to difficult legal issues. It is
this same methodology which guides the virtuous lawyer in facing one's
professional responsibilities to both his client and the community at large.
Echoing the discussion of the interdependence of the right and the
good addressed earlier in this Article, Nemeth also remarked that Aqui-
nas's legal philosophy is more like a map than a set of specific directives;
it helps the virtuous lawyer to get to the general goal of doing good with-
out identifying any particular steps that might seem indispensable to
other individuals. As Nemeth stated:
183. KRONMAN, supra note 42, at 269.
184. Id. at 41-44.
185. ETIENNE GILSON, THE PHILOSOPHY OF ST. THOMAS AQUINAS 327 (1929).
186. AQUINAS, supra note 16, at Ia-IIae, Q. 91, art. 2.
187. Id. at Ia-IIae, Q. 94, art. 2.
188. Charles P. Nemeth, A Commentary on the Natural Law, Moral Knowledge and




Thomistic moral reasoning heavily relies on natural law principles,
their inherent, indelible imprint on each person, and the content of
first principles involving the selection of good conduct and affirma-
tive avoidance of evil. Operating within the framework is the ex-
plicit recognition that general tenets of natural law reasoning do not
prescribe absolute formula for moral resolution, but instead aid the
person with an inclination, a habitus, a synderesis tugging to the
"good." Virtue, especially prudence, has a commanding function to
play. 190
Thus, Nemeth identified virtues, but especially prudence, as "the for-
gotten elements" in the implementation of legal theory for today. 191 Ne-
meth's recognition about the importance of virtue has been further
developed and reformulated by Daniel Mark Nelson. Keeping in mind
the earlier discussion about legal reasoning being (in large part) moral
reasoning, Nelson has done much to explicate the moral significance of
Thomistic thought, especially the role of the virtues, for the virtuous law-
yer. He recognized that the important issue for contemporary interpreta-
tion of Thomistic ethics is in "the significance that [Aquinas] seems to
attribute to prudence does not fit well with the standard natural-law read-
ing."192 While Nelson has argued that there can be tension between the
view which sees Thomistic ethics as natural law-based with other perspec-
tives which see them as based on the virtue of prudence as the "means for
achieving the good,"1193 the focus of his interpretation "resolves the diffi-
culty by showing how Thomas's understanding of ethics is more thor-
oughly prudential than generally assumed.' 94 His basic point is that
both the moral life and reflection upon it "depend on prudence and not
on knowledge of the natural law-at least not the versions of natural law
commonly attributed to [Aquinas]."' 95 Nelson considered that it is essen-
tially prudence rather than natural law which directs human practical rea-
son toward the moral and the good.196 However, Nelson was not the first
to assert the significance of prudence. Almost forty years earlier, Fr.
Frederick Copleston presented the suggestion that paved the way for Nel-
son's thesis when Copleston asserted that it is impossible to have moral
virtues without the intellectual virtue of prudence. 197
The virtuous lawyer can better appreciate the significance of the virtue
of prudence by examining the principal texts from the Summa Theologiae
190. Id. at 236.
191. Id at 249.
192. DANIEL M. NELSON, THE PRIORITY OF PRUDENCE: VIRTUE AND NATURAL LAW
THEORY IN THOMAS AQUINAS AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR MODERN ETmICS xi (1992).
193. Id.
194. Id at xii.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 27.
197. COPLESTON, supra note 180, at 215. Copleston continues by arguing that "it is not
possible to have the moral virtues without the intellectual virtue of 'prudence' which in-
clines us to choose the right means to the attainment of the objective good or to have




along with their contemporary commentaries. This examination will il-
lustrate how prudence can be an effective instrument for the virtuous law-
yer in finding and doing the good in contemporary public life; moreover,
this examination should also demonstrate that prudence has had an im-
portant impact on how the virtuous lawyer can attain justice in the Amer-
ican legal culture. 198
Previously I mentioned that there is a telos or goal involved with the
method Aquinas developed for living the moral life in which good is
sought and evil is avoided. Within the context of the Summa Theologiae,
the telos is identified with justice, the object of which directs "man in his
relations with others."'199 At the heart of the interpersonal relationship,
and therefore justice, is "a kind of equality" for the name of justice im-
plies equality for "things are adjusted [i.e., a person is in right relationship
with another person] when they are made equal, for equality is in refer-
ence of one thing to some other thing." 20 0 As social beings, people have
a variety of relationships with other persons; for these relations to be
right, they must be rectified "in relation to the person they are directed
[and] about such dealings there is a special virtue, and this is justice."'201
For Aquinas, justice has another identity which is "truth" and truth is
achieved "when the rectitude of the reason which is called truth is im-
printed on the will on account of its nighness to the reason. '202 But what
is this "rectitude of reason" which is essential for justice? The answer to
this question appeared in Aquinas's examination of the virtue of
prudence.
If the goal of human existence is to live in right relation with one an-
other in accordance with the First Principle and if this goal is to be at-
tained through the virtue of justice, how do members of the legal
profession come to discover what it is that will constitute the good in our
198. The contextual back drop for this final discussion about justice will be an examina-
tion of the legal and moral reasoning employed by the dissenting justices who, relying on
several virtues, sought justice in Dred Scott, Plessy, and Korematsu.
199. AQUINAS, supra note 16, at IIa-IIae, Q. 57, art. 1.
200. Id. A.P. d'Entr~ves has concluded that the concept of equality of people is funda-
mentally related to the theme of natural law. See A.P. D'ENTRvEs, NATURAL LAW 26(1970). Lloyd Weinreb has made a helpful contribution to the understanding of equality
that emerges from natural law systems. He argues that "equality has value as the comple-
ment of liberty; it is only in connection with liberty that equality can be understood as a
human value at all." LLOYD WEINREB, NATURAL LAW AND JUSTICE 161 (1987). I agree
with Weinreb that liberty (freedom) must somehow serve as a complement to equality.
After all, one can look at a group of slaves and argue that they as members of a community
have and share equality. The point is that equality must be tied in with human goods like
liberty, opportunity, wealth, and self-respect identified by both John Rawls's "thin theory
of the good" and Will Kymlicka. See KYMLICKA, supra note 87, at 33. John Finnis identi-
fies life, knowledge, play, aesthetic experience, sociability (friendship), practical reasona-
bleness, and religion as the relevant goods pursued by humans. FiN'Nis, supra note 33, ch.
IV. Elsewhere, Weinreb has pointed out that the conflict and tension which arise between
equality and liberty reveal that understanding one means that we must understand the
other-"[t]heir reconciliation takes us beyond either considered by itself." WEINREB,
supra, at 183.
201. AQUINAS, supra note 16, at IIa-Ilae, Q. 58, art. 2, ad 4.
202. Id. at IIa-Ilae, Q. 58, art. 4, ad 1.
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relations with our neighbors? It is through prudence. Aquinas exhorted,
"Prudence is a virtue most necessary for human life. For a good life con-
sists in good deeds. '20 3 It is here where Aquinas makes the connection
with justice through the notion of "rectitude of reason." He continued by
arguing:
[I]n order to do good deeds, it matters not only what a man does, but
also how he does it; to wit, that he do it from right choice and not
merely from impulse or passion. And, since choice is about things in
reference to the end, rectitude of choice requires two things; namely,
the due end, and something suitably ordained to that due end....
And to that which is suitably ordained to the due end man needs to
be rightly disposed by a habit in his reason, because counsel and
choice, which are about things ordained to the end, are acts of rea-
son. Consequently, an intellectual virtue is needed in the reason, to
perfect the reason, and make it suitably affected towards things or-
dained to the end; and this virtue is prudence. Consequently, pru-
dence is a virtue necessary to lead a good life.2°4
Aquinas elaborated on the significance of prudence to justice and do-
ing good through his argument that moral virtues cannot exist without
intellectual virtues such as prudence. Prudence offers and directs people
to "the right reason about things to be done"; it also gives them the un-
derstanding needed in the exercise of both practical and speculative mat-
ters.205 Knowing and understanding what is moral, what is "the good" of
the First Principle, cannot be accomplished without reliance on the intel-
lectual virtue of prudence.
But prudence is also a cardinal virtue according to Aquinas, and, as
such, has an inextricable relation to justice as a second cardinal virtue.20 6
Prudence exists in the human act of reasoning, and reasoning is directed
in its operation into justice.207 As a cognitive faculty, prudence gives the
virtuous lawyer perception or vision which becomes the foundation of
human knowledge. And human knowledge is that faculty which, in turn,
makes the virtuous lawyer know through reason what is good so that the
individual person and his work will be good.208
But exactly what is the good which is sought? Is it the antithesis of evil,
or is it something else? In the context of moral virtue, it is human good
that is sought.209 As an end or telos of the moral virtues, it "of necessity
pre-exists in the reason. ' 210 Prudence does not appoint the end but
serves as the means or direction by which people are guided toward this
end of the human good.211 The relevance of this goal of the human good
203. Id. at Ia-nae, Q. 57, art. 5.
204. Id. (emphasis added).
205. Id. at Ia-nae, Q. 58, art. 4.
206. Id. at Ia-Ilae, Q. 61, art. 2.
207. Id.
208. Id. at IIa-IIae, Q. 47, art. 4.





is vital to the American legal system and its virtuous practitioner.
If there is some question that the human good is geared toward the
individual in isolation rather than the individual in relationship with other
people, then Aquinas provided an answer to this question. He formu-
lated a solution that "prudence is right reason applied to action" and this
method of right reason follows the path of first, making the inquiry; sec-
ond, judging what has been discovered through inquiry; and, third, taking
action toward that which has been inquired about and judged.212 Once
this process is pursued and right reason is implemented, it becomes evi-
dent that the common good is better than the individual good according
to right reason.213 While the common good has the upper hand over the
individual good,214 the two are nonetheless intertwined, for it would seem
that the concern for the common good can only become manifest if the
sum total of the individual goods are viewed as being equal to one
another.215
Understanding the issue of how these perspectives of the good are to
be achieved and how justice is to be done-within the context of pru-
dence-is a vital component of the daily enterprise of the virtuous law-
yer. As James Keenan has demonstrated, the moral virtues are
connected by prudence which alone "establishes the virtues as
'moral.' ' 216 The virtue of prudence "perfects reason" and is essential to
the development of the moral virtues, especially justice which is con-
cerned with the external and interrelational operations of human af-
fairs.217 From the perspective of the virtuous lawyer, American law is a
body of rules and regulations intended to direct human conduct which
has a public effect, that is, an impact on individuals who are struggling
with their relationships with one another. As a body of rules, the law is in
need of interpretation so that lawyers, along with the rest of society, can
deal directly with human interrelationships and their regulation as cov-
ered by the law. It is precisely the responsibility of the virtuous lawyer to
engage in this interpretation to ensure that the goal of justice-of right
relationship with the neighbor-is obtained. Legal regulation exists not
for the sake of regulation itself, but rather for the sake of peaceful recon-
ciliation of differences and disputes.218 Aquinas addressed the impor-
tance of another virtue-justice-as the means of directing people
212. Id. at Ila-Ilae, Q. 47, art. 8.
213. Id. at IIa-Ilae, Q. 47, art. 10.
214. Id. at IIa-Ilae, Q. 58, art. 5.
215. Id. at IIa-Ilae, Q. 57, art. 1.
216. JAMES F. KEENAN, S.J., GOODNESS AND RIGHTNESS IN THOMAS AQUINAS'S
SUMMA THEOLOGIAE 92 (1992).
217. Id. at 100, 104.
218. AQUINAS, supra note 16, at IIa-IIae, Q. 58, art. 8 ("[Slince justice is directed to
others, it is not about the entire matter of moral virtue, but only about external actions and
things, under a certain special aspect of the object, in so far as one man is related to an-
other through them."); see also id. at IIa-Ilae, Q. 58, art. 10 ("[T]he matter of justice is
external operation, in so far as an operation or the thing used in that operation is duly
proportionate to another person, wherefore the mean of justice consists in a certain pro-
portion of equality between the external thing and the external person.").
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toward right relationship with one another when he stated that it "is
proper to justice, as compared with the other virtues, to direct man in his
relations with others .... -219
Jean Porter offered the summation that "Aquinas's theory of morality
is grounded in a theory of the human good that gives content to the fun-
damental norms of love of neighbor and nonmaleficence and provides
criteria by which to evaluate the goodness both of actions and of states of
character. '220 The relevance of the virtues to Aquinas's understanding of
the law becomes clear: if the law requires that people do good and avoid
evil, then the virtues direct individuals toward that which is good. And if
humans have developed a system of law which relies on reason to "pro-
ceed to the more particular determinations of certain matters," 221 the vir-
tue of justice becomes manifested in external human actions directed
toward "right relations among individuals, or between the individual and
the community. '222
The Jesuit philosopher Robert Henle made a connection between Tho-
mistic thought and its relevance to present day American legal institu-
tions. As with Porter and Nelson, the connection Henle makes is not
based so much on Thomas's treatment of natural law or the treatise on
law but on the virtues, especially justice.223 In particular, Henle identi-
fied Questions 57-62 of Summa Theologiae I[sic]-II as particularly rele-
vant.224  By placing Henle's observation in the context of the more
recent work completed by both Porter and Nelson, the virtuous lawyer
gets to see more clearly the substantive contributions which Thomistic
thought can make to the American legal scene of today.
Porter contended that, within the context of Thomistic thought, pru-
dence directs or determines courses of activity and specific actions that
implement the virtues in the particular circumstances of everyday human
life.225 It would seem that prudence has an influence on the development
of that which is just. In noting that human moral life has a goal or teleo-
logical component, 226 Nelson suggested that as individuals moved toward
the telos, they need to acquire and develop the practical reason or knowl-
219. Id. at IIa-IIae, Q. 57, art. 1.
220. JEAN PORTER, Tim RECOVERY OF VIRTUE: THE RELEVANCE OF AQUINAS FOR
CHRISTIAN ETHICS 31-32 (1990).
221. AQUINAS, supra note 16, at Ia-IIae, Q. 91, art. 3.
222. PORTER, supra note 220, at 124.
223. ROBERT HENLE, S.J., ST. THOMAS AQUINAS AND AMERICAN LAW, THOMISTIC PA-
PERS II 78 (1986).
224. Id I believe that there is a typographical error made in Henle's text. Summa
Theologiae Ia-Ilae, Questions 57-62 do not deal with justice but the intellectual and cardi-
nal virtues. While the virtues do play an important role in our understanding Aquinas's
contribution to American law, I believe Fr. Henle, when speaking of Thomas's discussion
of justice intends to refer to Questions 57-62 which deal directly with the subject of justice.
225. PORTER, supra note 220, at 159.
226. NELSON, supra note 192, at 32.
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edge necessary, and "this is precisely the concern of prudence. '227
In acting morally and in accordance with the law which can help people
live their lives in better relationship with others, they must first identify
courses of action to take. Second, they have to make selections about
which specific actions they pursue and which ones they will not. Pru-
dence is essential to deliberating and choosing well. As Nelson argued,
"Willing the right good and choosing the right means both require pru-
dence. '228 There should be no doubt that prudence is essential to making
the right choices about how we direct our activities that relate to our
community lives. As Nelson stipulated:
Prudence is a necessary virtue for practical reasoning because it en-
ables one to do good deeds, the activity in which a good life consists,
and to become a good and happy person. For a deed to be truly
good, Thomas explains, it has to be done in the right way and for the
right reasons. Harming a man out of anger, for example, would be
opposed to justice as well as to prudence, while harming a man to
prevent him from maliciously injuring an innocent victim could well
be a prudential act of virtue. Prudence enables us to act in the right
way, for the right reasons, and at the right time. It seeks to discern
what is to be done now or in the future on the basis of knowledge of
the present situation and past experience. Prudence gives one a
sense of moral perspective. 229
This is not to say that Aquinas's understanding of natural law and the
First Principle are immaterial or extraneous to his understanding of how
one seeks and lives the well-directed good life in relation with others.
Natural law and the First Principle are important for setting the stage of
life.230 But the real question for Aquinas is, once the stage is set, how do
individuals perform, that is, how do they know what it is they should do
and how do they accomplish these tasks? The virtue of prudence is in-
strumental in letting each person focus one's vision so that each knows
what to do in response to God's law that participates in our world
through the natural law. Prudence is crucial to each human making the
decision guided by the exercise of practical reason. While legal theories
227. Id. at 39. Nelson also states that prudence focuses on "the knowledge of particu-
lars which are the matter of action" and that it is the "right reason" that is instrumental in
directing our action and choices about the right end. Id. at 102-03.
228. Id. at 50.
229. Id. at 81. Nelson states:
Through the moral virtues we intend good ends, and through prudent delib-
eration, judgment, and command of action we are able to attain them. As we
have already seen, the distinction between ends and means is far from abso-
lute .... Prudence, strictly speaking, is concerned with the means toward
ends to which we are oriented by the moral virtues. The moral virtues, how-
ever, depend for their direction on the ordering and control of prudence.
Id. at 84.
230. Id. at 96. As Nelson explains his point, "[N]atural law serves an explanatory func-
tion rather than the function of providing specific moral information. It explains how we
come to reason practically without telling us how to reason, and it explains why we are able
to act virtuously without guiding our actions." Id. at 100. For Nelson, natural law is the




that extend from natural law provide the most basic guidance through the
First Principle, it is the virtue of prudence which directs members of the
legal culture, especially the virtuous lawyer, to specify what action they
must take in the particular circumstances of daily conflict and life to do
that which is good and avoid that which is evil.231 As Nelson suggests,
"In order to determine the rightness or wrongness of acts, according to
Thomas [i.e., whether they constitute doing good or evil], we have to de-
termine whether or not they are reasonable and virtuous. ''232
If these virtues (i.e., prudence, justice, wisdom, and courage) develop a
model of the virtuous lawyer, have they been revealed in any concrete
legal contexts? The dissenting voices of Justices Curtis and Mclean in
Dred Scott, Justice Harlan in Plessy, and Justices Murphy, Jackson, and
Roberts in Korematsu as models of virtuous lawyers illustrate my point
that Aquinas's understandings of law and virtue have both meaning and
application to the American legal profession of today.
These jurists relied on virtues to deal with three of the most difficult
cases yet raised in American law. I suggest here that the virtuous lawyer
could, in some cases, reach the same decision as other lawyers; however,
the virtuous lawyer might also consider the case differently. While results
of decisions are important, they are not everything in the legal process. It
is my view that the virtuous lawyer strives to be a more discerning indi-
vidual-to be an "exemplar" of the virtuous lawyer by assessing what the
case is, where it should go, and how does the virtuous lawyer contribute
to attaining the just end.233 If the goal of justice is the just end as I have
suggested, how do lawyers get there? My approach to addressing this
231. As Nelson points out:
Because the power of reasoning practically is part of our nature, and because
we therefore participate in a special way in God's reason or eternal law,
every action, power, and passion under the control of reason especially be-
longs to the natural law .... Nature provides only the most general sort of
guidance in the sense that natural inclinations provide the very wide bounda-
ries within which prudential reason operates.... [P]ractical reason under the
direction of prudence is concerned with obtaining physical, social, intellec-
tual, and spiritual goods. We do not naturally know, however, how any of
those goods are rightly (which is to say reasonably and virtuously) to be ob-
tained, except in the sense that it is natural for rational creatures to reason
about such matters. We do not have natural knowledge of the moral species
of acts. The moral specification of acts is a prudential judgment of practical
reason.
Id at 121-22 (emphasis in original).
232. Id. at 127.
233. See also George Kannar, Strenuous Virtues, Virtuous Lives: The Social Vision of
Antonin Scalia, 12 CAPDozo L. REv. 1845, 1867 (1991) (suggesting that the direction in
which the virtuous judge proceeds can vary from transcending the social and political con-
texts of the day to immersing one's self in them). Kannar indicates:
[Tihe type of "virtue" that ultimately distinguishes the extraordinary player
from the ordinary highly skilled professional is not this technical legal "tal-
ent,".... The vision that makes the difference, then, is of the type we call
"peripheral": a sense not just of what you personally believe or value, or of
how to execute the standard moves, but a deeper, more intuitive and more
complex "sense of where you are."
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question may be more anecdotal than scientific, but it is one way of
achieving the goal which underlies the duties of being a lawyer. The cases
of Dred Scott, Plessy, and Korematsu supply several factual contexts in
which present-day members of the legal profession can reflect on how the
virtuous lawyer might approach assessing who we are, where do we want
to go, and how do we get there.
Dred Scott raised the issue of the status of an African-American slave
who had been taken into a territory where slavery was illegal. While not
necessarily reflecting his own personal views, Chief Justice Taney, in writ-
ing for the majority, noted the popular sentiment that black people have
"been regarded as beings of an inferior order, and altogether unfit to as-
sociate with the white race, either in social or political relation[s]." 234 Be-
ing the careful jurist that he was,235 Taney investigated these views in the
context of the foundational documents of the republic, that is, the Decla-
ration of Independence and the United States Constitution. In his des-
perate effort to justify the Court's decision both legally and morally, he
turned to the language of the Declaration which states that "all men are
created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain
unalienable rights; [and] ... that to secure these rights, Governments are
instituted .... ,,236 While Taney was not alone in asserting this view, he
hastened to add that this generally embracing and protective language
was not intended to apply to the African race presumably because this
class "formed no part of the people who framed and adopted" the Decla-
ration.237 Regrettably, the Chief Justice presumed not only what the
drafters intended but what the language must mean in the minds of the
readers of this text as well when he insisted, without corroboration of any
kind, that no one in "the civilized world" would suppose that these pro-
tections would extend to the "negro race. '238 Curiously, his presumption
that the "unhappy black race were separated from the white by indelible
marks.., and were never thought of or spoken of except as property,"239
took no account of other, more ancient authority in the Bible telling
Christian and Jew alike that the black race had been earlier thought of in
quite another regard.240
234. Dred Scot, 60 U.S. at 407. Chief Justice Taney continued with traditional views of
blacks as articles of merchandise who could be "justly and lawfully be reduced to slavery
for his benefit." Id.
235. See generally Bernard Schwartz, Supreme Court Superstars: The Ten Greatest
Judges, 31 TULSA L.J. 93, 102-08 (1995).
236. Dred Scot, 60 U.S. at 410.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id. (emphasis added).
240. In 2 Chronicles 14:9-13, we are told about the conflict between Asa's army and that
of the Ethiopian Zerah who had "an army of a million men and three hundred chari-
ots .. " Isaiah's prophecy tells of King Hezekiah being warned that King Tirhakah of
Ethiopia (sometimes called Nubia) "has set out to fight against you." Isaiah 37:9. Jer-
emiah's prophecy informs about the Ethiopian (or Nubian) Ebed-melech, a servant but
also a man of influence in King Zedekiah's household, who persuaded the king that evil
doers had cast Jeremiah into a muddy cistern and that the king should have the prophet
rescued. To this request, the king agreed and, because of Ebed-melech, Jeremiah was res-
[Vol. 50
THE VIRTUOUS LAWYER
In the Constitution, Taney had firmer texts with which to work. He
pointed to two clauses which justified for him the conclusion that blacks
"were not regarded as a portion of the people or citizens of the Govern-
ment .... ,,241 The first clause upon which he relied is taken from Article
I, section 9, clause 1 and reserved to each state the right to import slaves
until 1808.242 The second clause is found in Article IV, section 2, clause 3
and enabled a slave owner of one state to reclaim his "property" who
may have escaped into another state's territory.243 In Taney's mind, these
two clauses were sufficient to deny black people "or their posterity" the
"blessings of liberty, or any of the personal rights so carefully provided
for the citizen. ' 244 Curiously, the Chief Justice made no reference to Ar-
ticle I, section 2, clause 3 which considered each black to be three-fifths of
a person for the purpose of assessing representatives to the House of
Representatives. In this regard, the black received greater status than the
Native American whose presence in any Congressional district was imma-
terial, that is, the American Indian was not a person or any percentage
thereof for assigning Congressional representation.245 Ultimately, Taney
concluded that because of these texts as well as the general history of race
relations in the United States, not even Congress could enact legislation
making "free" slaves who were taken by their owners into nonslave
territory.246
All of the other justices of the Court wrote their own opinions. With
the exception of the two dissenters, Justices McLean and Curtis, the other
members of the Court generally agreed with the Chief Justice concerning
the status of the black race in the American legal and political culture of
the day. It is important to remember that these were not evil men; rather,
they considered themselves as they were considered by others to be good,
law abiding citizens and public servants. Noting that the case involved
"private rights of value" as well as "constitutional principles of the high-
est importance," 247 Justice Wayne regretted that the Court could not be
unanimous in supporting Taney's opinion.248 The source of the regret
was not that McLean and Curtis were from the outset different people
with very different world views. Rather it might be that the dissenters
approached the case and the issues it presented in a different light that
was guided by forces including certain virtues.
I suggest here that my model of the virtuous lawyer would recognize
how vital the absence of evidence of discrimination is to adjudicating a
cued from certain death. Jeremiah 38:7-13. Again, in the New Testament, in Acts 8:26-40,
we hear of the Ethiopian eunuch who was the treasurer of the queen of the Ethiopians and
was baptized by Philip.




245. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
246. Dred Scot, 60 U.S. at 452.
247. I at 454 (Wayne, J., concurring).
248. Id at 455.
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case like Dred Scott. The dissenters-two examples of the virtuous law-
yer-demonstrated elements essential to this model when they realized
and publicly acknowledged that the Chief Justice and the rest of the
Court were wrong. Justices McLean and Curtis raised questions and of-
fered answers which escaped the consideration of the members of the
majority. In particular, it was the appropriation and exercise of the vir-
tues of wisdom, courage, prudence, and justice which enabled the two
dissenters to understand the case more broadly and deeply and to offer
the better, more equitable solution. At the outset of his dissent, Justice
McLean challenged Taney's view that the law had long acknowledged the
inferior position of the members of the black race. He pointed out that
the different and inferior treatment extended to the black was "more a
matter of taste than of law." 249 In fact, the legal tradition would tend to
support the dissenters' view more than the position of Chief Justice Taney
and the majority. For example, under both European civil and English
common law, the removal of a slave from slave territory to nonslave terri-
tory led to emancipation. 250  Moreover, under his compilation of the
English common law of 1765 to 1769, William Blackstone noted that the
"spirit of liberty is so deeply implanted in our constitution, and rooted
even in our very soil, that a slave or a negro, the moment he lands in
England, falls under the protection of the laws, and with regard to all
natural rights becomes eo instanti a freeman."'251
Certainly, then, the notion that the negro slave was anything less than
another fellow human being deserving of the same entitlements of citi-
zenship did not comport with the law of other civilized nations prior to
and at the time Dred Scott was decided. But Chief Justice Taney still
constructed his justification that the negro was not entitled to the same
rights and privileges as citizens because they were not deemed citizens by
the framers of the Declaration and the Constitution.252 Yet Madison, as a
principal drafter of the Constitution and co-author of The Federalist Pa-
pers, suggested otherwise in a way that supports the dissenters and coun-
ters the majority.
The first insight offered by Madison concerning the wrongness of slav-
ery is in his contrast and comparison between the Confederation and the
Constitution. Importation of slaves would have been a permanent fea-
ture under the Confederation, but under the Constitution, it would be
permitted for only twenty years. 253 Admittedly, this particular text of
Madison was silent on the propriety or impropriety of slavery beyond this
period of twenty years; the only clear point was the recognition that the
249. Id. at 533 (McLean, J., dissenting).
250. Id. at 534.
251. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *123. Blackstone later commented that
since the principles of English law give no countenance to slavery, "the slave is entitled to
the same liberty in England before, as after, baptism; and, whatever service the heathen
negro owed to his English master, the same is he bound to render when a chieftain." Id. at
*413.
252. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 410-12.
253. THE FEDERALIST No. 38, at 109 (James Madison) (William Brock ed., 1992).
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importation of slaves beyond the year 1808 would no longer be tolerated.
However, in several subsequent papers, Madison questioned the longev-
ity of the institution itself.
In The Federalist No. 42, Madison, unlike Taney, mentioned not only
the cessation of slave importation after 1808, but the stiff fine [for the
time] as well. 254 But Madison was not satisfied with so indirect a criticism
of slavery and its maintenance as an American institution. He continued
by arguing that it would have been preferable to not postpone the ban-
ning of importation until 1808 but to outlaw continuation of this "barba-
rism of modem policy" immediately.25 5 The most extensive discussion of
slavery and the status of the negro offered by Madison appears in The
Federalist No. 54 which addressed the matter of apportioning seats to the
House of Representatives.
Here, we see Madison's critical acknowledgment that the Constitution
was a document of compromise rather than one of complete principle.256
Madison began his critique by suggesting that opponents to the Constitu-
tion understood slaves to be property rather than fellow human beings;
however, the Madisonian Publius quickened the chase by offering an op-
posing view.257 He disabused the reader that a slave is merely property
rather than a person.258 Madison argued that while the slave may "ap-
pear to be degraded from the human rank ... and classed with those
irrational animals which fall under the legal domination of property," 259
he recognized that the negro is a member of society who is both rational
creation and moral person.260
No doubt these thoughts had a strong impact on Justice McLean who
acknowledged that "James Madison, that great and good man, a leading
member of the Federal convention, was solicitous to guard the language
of [the Constitution] so as not to convey the idea that there could be
property in man. '261 Justice McLean was a practical man who under-
stood well the times in which he lived, yet the execution of his office in
this case was guided by the virtue of practical wisdom and prudence.
While noting that the federal republic was not created especially for the
black, it was nonetheless created to include him because, at the time of
the Constitution's adoption, there were states in which blacks did enjoy
the rights and privileges of citizenship.262 Justice Curtis's research re-
vealed that at the time the Articles of Confederation were ratified, all
free "native-born inhabitants of the States of New Hampshire, Massachu-
setts, New York, New Jersey, and North Carolina, though descended
254. THE FEDERALIST No. 42, at 181 (James Madison) (William Brock ed., 1992).
255. Id. at 182.
256. THE FEDERALIST No. 54, at 278 (James Madison) (William Brock ed., 1992).








from African slaves .... were not only citizens of those States," but also
enjoyed "the franchise of electors" and were "on equal terms with other
citizens. '263 This attitude of five of the states is vital to understanding
exactly who were the "people" who formed "the more perfect union" of
the Constitution. Chief Justice Taney's analysis of the two clauses ex-
amined earlier 264 suggested that the negro race was "not regarded as a
portion of people or the citizens of the Government" formed under the
Constitution. 265 In applying wisdom, prudence, courage, and justice, Mc-
Lean convincingly argued to the contrary that "as free colored persons
were then citizens of at least five States, and so in every sense part of the
people of the United States, they were among those for whom and whose
posterity the Constitution was ordained and established. 266
In order to dispel the myth that the black race was inferior to the white
race as suggested in the social history referred to by Chief Justice Taney,
Justice McLean wisely, prudently, and justly reminded his fellow Ameri-
cans that the white man had also been enslaved at different times in dif-
ferent communities. He stated that "white men were made slaves. All
slavery has its origin in power, and is against right. '267 One important
justification for this view held and offered by Justice McLean was that he
took seriously the language of the Declaration quoted by the Chief Jus-
tice that "all men are created equal ... [and] endowed by their Creator
with certain unalienable rights. ' 268 Or, as Justice McLean himself said,
"A slave is not a mere chattel. He bears the impress of his Maker, and is
amenable to the laws of God and man; and he is destined to an endless
existence." 269
One would think that forty years later after a civil war was fought and
the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments were added to
the Constitution, the question of equality of the races would have been
addressed and answered once and for all. However, the case of Plessy
raised again the existence of practices and beliefs which accorded inferior
status to individuals who were either black or shared some black ances-
try.270 While we are never told what his first name is (although we are
informed that the Ferguson in the case was the Hon. John H. Ferguson, a
263. Id. at 572-73 (Curtis, J., dissenting). Justice Curtis resigned from the Supreme
Court shortly after Dred Scott was decided. Although he gave financial considerations asjustification for his resignation, it has been pointed out that his dissatisfaction with the
outcome of Dred Scott was an important factor as well. See Emily F. Van Tassel, Resigna-
tions and Removals: A History of Federal Judicial Service-and Disservice-1789-1992, 142
U. PA. L. REv. 333, 356 (1993).
264. See supra text accompanying notes 241-46.
265. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 411.
266. Id. at 582 (Curtis, J., dissenting).
267. Id. at 538. (emphasis added) (Curtis, J., dissenting).
268. Id. at 410.
269. Id. at 550 (McLean, J., dissenting). Justice McLean's view reflects the thoughts of
St. Paul in his letter to the Roman Christian community where he states: "Esteem others
more highly than yourself.... Do not be proud, but be ready to mix with humble people.
Do not keep thinking how wise you are." Romans 12:10, 16.
270. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 537.
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Louisiana state judge assigned to the criminal district court), we know
that Mr. Plessy had a mixed racial ancestry: he was seven-eighths white
and one-eighth black.271 We also know that he was a citizen and "entitled
to every recognition, right, privilege, and immunity secured to ... the
white race. '272 On June 7, 1892, Mr. Plessy boarded a train whose opera-
tors were obliged to carry both white and black passengers, but, in ac-
cordance with a state statute, railways were required to "provide equal
but separate accommodations for the white, and colored races. .... 273
Mr. Plessy violated this statute when he purchased a first class ticket and
sat in a coach reserved for white passengers.274 Any passenger who vio-
lated this provision by sitting in a coach or area designated for the race
not his own was liable to criminal prosecution and subject to either a fine
or prison sentence if convicted. 275 As a consequence of his action, Mr.
Plessy was charged with and convicted for violating the statute.276 He
subsequently challenged the state laws on the grounds that they violated
the Thirteenth Amendment which abolished slavery and the Fourteenth
Amendment which prohibited race-restrictive state legislation.277 In his
decision for the majority affirming the judgment convicting Mr. Plessy,
Justice Brown found that Mr. Plessy's position was premised on the fal-
lacy that "enforced separation of the two races stamps the colored race
with a badge of inferiority. '278 Justice Brown bridled at the notion that
equal rights could only be achieved with the "commingling of the two
races. ' 279 He rejected this proposition by declaring that "[i]f the two
races are to meet upon terms of social equality, it must be the result of
natural affinities, a mutual appreciation of each other's merits, and a vol-
untary consent of individuals. '280 But the wise and discerning person
might ask how could other individuals discover these "natural affinities"
or develop "mutual appreciation" if they were legally forbidden to be
with one another?
Curiously, Justice Brown concluded the majority opinion with the mus-
ing that if Mr. Plessy were considered white (as indeed he might be under
some state laws where the percentage of white to black ancestry was cru-
cial in determining this question) that would have dramatically changed
the complexion of the case and very possibly its outcome. 281 There were
no separate concurring opinions, and there was one dissenting opinion
271. Id. at 538.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 540.
274. Id. at 538.
275. Id. at 541. Excepted from coverage under this act were "nurses attending children
of the other race." Id.
276. Id. at 539.
277. Id. at 542.
278. Id. at 551.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Id. at 552.
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authored by the first Justice Harlan. 282
Harlan has been described as "the quintessential voice crying in the
wilderness" because he publicly rejected the separate-but-equal justifica-
tion of the Louisiana law.283 In seeking justice for Mr. Plessy, John Mar-
shall Harlan exercised wisdom and courage:
[He] transcended, without slighting, mechanical legal analysis; he
sought to announce fundamental constitutional truths as well. He
spoke not only to his peers, but to his society, and, more important,
across time to later generations. He was, in this sense, a secular
prophet, and we continue, long after Plessy ... to benefit from his
wisdom and courage. 284
It took wisdom to see and courage to challenge Justice Brown and the
majority with these words: "The destinies of the two races ... are indis-
solubly linked together, and the interests of both require that the com-
mon government of all shall not permit the seeds of race hate to be
planted under the sanction of law."'285 Harlan could step back from the
case and observe that "the arbitrary separation of citizens" along racial
lines generates an unconstitutional "badge of servitude" that cannot be
reconciled with any source of lawful authority.286 By allowing these vir-
tues to guide his investigation, Justice Harlan identified that the major-
ity's rationale to uphold the state action in Plessy would lead to injustice
of a subtle variety. Noting that slavery as a lawful institution was now a
thing of the past, Harlan could courageously prophesy that this "sinister
legislation" would dangerously interfere with the goal of enabling citi-
zens, regardless of their race, to obtain "the blessings of freedom" guar-
anteed to all.287
Almost another half century was to pass, thereby allowing the opinions
of the Dred Scott and Plessy dissenters to have their effect on other law-
yers. But the winds of war were to bring again to the nation's highest
court questions regarding official conduct denying to some what was ex-
pected by others. The time was the Second World War and the petitioner
was Mr. Fred Korematsu, an American citizen of Japanese ancestry who
remained in a particular area of California contrary to the mandates of
the Civilian Exclusion Order No. 34 issued by a U.S. Army general. Gen-
eral DeWitt's order required that all persons of Japanese ancestry were to
be removed from specified areas of the west coast of the United States as
long as hostilities with the Japanese Empire continued. 288 While noting
282. Id. at 552 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice Brewer took no part in the deliberation
or deciding of this case.
283. William J. Brennan, In Defense of Dissents, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 427, 431-32 (1986).
284. Id. at 432.
285. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 560 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
286. Id. at 562.
287. Id. at 563.
288. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216. Unlike the court in Plessy, see supra text accompany-
ing note 271, the Korematsu Court was able to dignify the petitioner by acknowledging that
he had a first as well as last name, acknowledging that he was not simply the petitioner,
Korematsu, but was also a human being, like others, entitled to the dignity which a body of
names gives to each person and his individuality.
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that Mr. Korematsu's loyalty to the United States was never in ques-
tion,289 and while taking account of the belief that "[n]othing short ... of
the gravest imminent danger to the public safety" could constitutionally
justify the conduct pursued by the military authorities against American
citizens,29° the majority opinion authored by the great civil libertarian
Hugo Black concluded that not even "the calm perspective of hindsight"
could say that the actions taken by the federal authorities against Japa-
nese-American citizens who were physically removed from their homes
and interned in prison camps were not justified.291 But once again, sev-
eral lawyers whose actions were influenced by wisdom, courage, and pru-
dence took steps to voice their concern that a great injustice had been
accomplished under the guise of the Constitution. These lawyers were
Justices Roberts, Murphy, and Jackson.
It was wisdom which led Justice Roberts to see that thousands of loyal
Americans who happened to be of Japanese ancestry were being forced
into "concentration camps" (as the Jews and other non-Aryans were in
German camps around the same time) without any evidence whatsoever
of conduct or belief which would place into question their loyalty to their
country. 292 Unlike their counterparts in the Nazi camps, Fred Kore-
matsu and his fellow citizens may not have been literally deprived of life,
but they were-as were the inmates of the European camps spawned by
the Nazi hate machine-denied their property and their liberty by Gen-
eral DeWitt's orders. Sharing the wisdom of his colleague, Justice Rob-
erts, Justice Murphy also had the courage to identify this action taken by
the federal government for what it was-an "ugly abyss of racism. ''293
Knowing what it was that both he and the people of the United States
were dealing with, Justice Murphy offered prudent counsel which was just
as helpful in 1944 as it is over fifty years later to detect and avoid the
abyss of racism in our Federal republic. His focus was on how a nation
can "deal intelligently with matters so vital to the physical security of the
nation. '294 These words were used to caution the critics of the military
authorities who were waging war against totalitarian and racist regimes.
But they are equally applicable to the people who were waging a just war
and serve as a warning that they not become like those against whom
they have been forced to take arms. For the defenders must also "deal
intelligently" with the method used to protect all of those whom they
serve. Justice Murphy's practical wisdom provided him with the clarity of
vision enabling him to acknowledge publicly that there were a few Japa-
nese Americans who were disloyal to the United States because they did
take action which aided and abetted Imperial Japan.295 Murphy's coura-
289. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216, 219.
290. Id. at 218.
291. Id. at 224.
292. Id at 226 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
293. Id. at 233 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
294. Id. at 234.
295. Id. at 240.
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geous public exercise of wisdom revealed to his fellow citizens the danger
of making the unjustifiable conclusion that if a few Japanese-Americans
were disloyal, then they must all be suspect. As he pointed out, what
became of that important principle of Anglo-American legal logic and
common sense that only "individual guilt is the sole basis for the depriva-
tion of rights ... .,,296 The exercise of prudence as well as the display of
his wise discernment raised the question unanswered by the military au-
thorities: why were individual Japanese-Americans not accorded the
same privilege of individual investigations and hearings as was accorded
to American citizens of German and Italian ancestry who might be sus-
pected of assisting the causes of the Third Reich or Fascist Italy?297 For
Justice Murphy, the goal was a democratic way of life for all Americans
regardless of their race, ancestry, or any other nonmerit consideration. 298
In the exercise of prudence, this goal could not be achieved by engaging
in the blindly discriminatory action pursued by the west coast American
military authority.
It is vital to stress here that the lawyer who adopts virtue in the exer-
cise of his or her duty would concentrate more on ascertaining whether or
not the actions taken by citizen and government in Dred Scott, Plessy,
and Korematsu were warranted. What would impress the virtuous law-
yer in these cases is the realization that the best answers to the difficult
problems faced in each of these cases all dealing with a form of discrimi-
nation (one issue which remains at the heart of difficult cases to this day)
might better be achieved through the exercise not of rules mechanically
applied but through a search for just results based on the use of rules that
rely on the application of wisdom, courage, and prudence.
Should the virtuous lawyer (or judge) have been more concerned with
facts crucial about the specific practices of discrimination in each of these
cases? Should the virtuous lawyer have been more understanding of the
broad underlying social issues also contained in these cases, such as pre-
serving a union of states or winning a global war? What, in essence,
would a virtuous lawyer have done differently than was done in these
cases?
I begin addressing these questions with the three general issues upon
which a virtue system focuses. I restate these issues so they conform to
the particulars of virtue about which a lawyer would be concerned: (1)
what kind of people are the parties and the lawyers in this case and what
do their interests mean for them and the rest of society; (2) what is it that
the parties and lawyers desire and how do these wishes for legal relief
relate to the interests of both the parties and the community at large
which will be affected by the legal precedent established by the court's
decision; and (3) what does the virtuous lawyer consider in order to help
reach a just or, better yet, the most just decision? The lawyer's reliance
296. Id.
297. Id. at 241.
298. Id. at 242.
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on and practice of the virtues of justice, prudence, temperance (or re-
straint), compassion, and wisdom will help this lawyer address these three
basic issues.
The lawyer recognizes that the role of the legal process in any case is to
contribute to a decision that resolves the conflict based on the law as it
applies to each case. The lawyer's role and responsibilities call for a syn-
thesis of fact-finding, interpretation of judicial precedent and applicable
statutes, and the application of these interpretations to each case. In situ-
ations paralleling those in these three cases, the virtuous lawyer acknowl-
edges that legal authority contains a broad purpose of ensuring
protection of society and the institutions which cement it together as well
as the interests of the individuals who make up the society. In the imple-
mentation of these broad goals, lawyers play prominent roles.
In discrimination cases, the just end toward which the virtuous lawyer
is inclined, then, begins with determining whether or not a person was
prejudicially treated contrary to the law. The lawyer's reflection and con-
duct to help resolve the case are molded by the mission of reaching this
end. The virtue of justice, in short, aids the lawyer in recognizing that the
implementation of the legal process entails working toward this goal of
the just result. The result is shaped by correct implementation of the
public policy designed to protect people from improper discrimination
because they happen to be of some particular ancestry. Inherent in this
goal is the understanding that individuals should be treated fairly without
consideration given to nonmerit considerations. As Justice McLean re-
minds us, we all bear the impress of our Maker, and we are all destined to
the same endless existence.299 While there could well be cases in which
some human distinctions may be valid criteria for making important pub-
lic policy decisions, there is no justification warranting the use of such
criteria in cases where the exercise of wisdom, prudence, and justice
strongly counsel otherwise.
But how does the virtuous lawyer attain this goal that is determined by
the virtue of justice. If justice is the goal, the virtue of prudence can be
relied upon to reach that goal by providing the means to act justly.300
One of the questions associated with a legal profession based on virtue is
how do we get to the result or goal we seek? The answer to this question
requires patient attentiveness that is essential to examine the facts of the
case and to hear out the concerns of the parties involved. The prudent
lawyer strives to understand fully the multiplicity of concerns at stake in
each case. By the same token, the prudent lawyer is also equally atten-
tive to the position and concerns of the state to determine if its action can
be justified. In the cases examined in this Article, the virtuous lawyers
determined if there were some overarching justification why those indi-
viduals like Dred Scott, Plessy, and Korematsu (and those individuals
who were similarly situated) should be subjected to discriminatory con-
299. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 550 (McLean, J., dissenting).
300. See supra text accompany notes 223-29.
1997]
SMU LAW REVIEW
duct from which their fellow Americans were immune. Prudence di-
rected their work and led them to the conclusion that the discrimination
in these cases could not be justified.
Prudence relies on the ability to distinguish between different sets of
values that can promote or defeat the attainment of the just end. Re-
cently, Judge Leon Higginbotham, Chief Judge Emeritus of the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, reminded the legal profession that
it was not bad lawyers who allowed the "separate but equal" rule of
Plessy v. Ferguson301 but rather "the wrong values" which "poisoned this
society for decades. '302 Prudence guides the action for investigating the
reality of what are the values that determine the policies of the institu-
tion. The prudent lawyer's search can reveal that some actions taken by
the state which seem discriminatory may be warranted. Yet, the prudent
lawyer must be vigilant in one's concern about the harms as well as the
good that emerges from government action. A comprehensive under-
standing of these goods and harms and how they relate to one another
are vital to the prudent lawyer in either going along with or combating
the government's action.
Allied with the virtue of prudence is the virtue of wisdom. The virtu-
ous lawyer strives to enlighten one's self. The virtue of wisdom is the
force motivating the inquiry that leads to the probing insight needed to
comprehend and appreciate the subtleties of each case. In cases like
Dred Scott, Plessy, and Korematsu, the virtue of wisdom fortifies the law-
yer with the sagacity to understand the goal of effectively addressing dis-
crimination. Wisdom helps the lawyer discern whether or not individuals
have been unjustifiably discriminated against. Wisdom also clarifies the
vital distinction between the good and the evil which may be fostered by
acts that discriminate between citizens. Reinhold Niebuhr once men-
tioned that "[t]he most perfect justice cannot be established if the moral
imagination of the individual does not seek to comprehend the needs and
interests of his fellows. '303 Wisdom activates the moral imagination
which can better see what facts constitute the "most perfect justice."
Like most individuals in public life, lawyers are open to criticism for
the actions they pursue and the decisions they make. History shows that
the lawyers who take the right but unpopular stand can suffer.304 Verbal
castigation as well as physical threat can be directed-as happened to
Atticus Finch-toward lawyers. The virtue of courage helps steel the
lawyer against unwarranted criticism and perhaps even against bodily
threat by reinforcing the practice of the other virtues and by helping the
lawyer meet harm or danger as one works toward the just end and the
301. See supra text accompanying notes 268-79.
302. A. Leon Higginbotham, An Open Letter to Justice Clarence Thomas from a Federal
Judicial Colleague, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 1005, 1010 (1992).
303. REINHOLD NIEBUHR, MORAL MAN AND IMMORAL SOCIETY 257-58 (1960).
304. See INGO MOLLER, HITLER'S JUSTICE 196 (Deborah L. Schneider trans., 1991),
where the author argues that there were very few principled judges in the Third Reich who
were willing to take a stand against the injustices of the Nazi regime.
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resolution of conflict among the parties. Courage is the virtue which also
sustains the lawyer in weathering the storm and surviving unjust and im-
proper criticism. Courage reinforces the lawyer's will to do justice. Spe-
cifically, in these cases, courage reinforced the virtuous lawyers to deflect
the criticism of those who displayed animosity or indifference to the no-
tion of equality and nondiscrimination.
My list of qualities for the virtuous lawyer may not be comprehensive,
but it does give the members of the legal profession some further under-
standing and greater insight on valid and valuable qualities from which
the guarantors of fairness and justice in the United States can profit.
VII. SOME FINAL THOUGHTS
A brief return to the thoughts of Robert Henle helps reformulate the
inquiry into virtue's relevance to the contemporary American legal scene.
Henle suggested that the Thomistic notion of justice has been appropri-
ated by some American lawyers in their examination and discussion of
two sets of questions: the first involves rules of procedure which guaran-
tee fairness; the second concerns rights of the individual.30 5 Fairness and
the rights of the individual are themes which are familiar to lawyers. But,
notwithstanding this general familiarization, the task here is to under-
stand what relation virtues have to the law and justice in the context of
American legal institutions.
The virtuous lawyer has a special task in working with the laws and
legal institutions designed to protect the individual as well as the commu-
nity from the evils which human beings direct toward one another. The
work of the virtuous lawyer is especially relevant to safeguarding against
such evils and to ensuring that the good prevails.306 Several years ago
Chief Judge Harry Edwards of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia suggested that a lawyer has the duty not only to serve one's
clients but also to serve the public good.307 Judge Edwards further con-
cluded that these two duties are not mutually exclusive. 308 Borrowing
from Judge Edwards, I suggest that a lawyer also serves two constituen-
cies. He has some duty to see that justice is brought to both parties as
well as to society at large. As Judge Edwards indicates, these two respon-
305. HENLE, supra note 223, at 71.
306. See JACQUES MARITAIN, THE PERSON AND THE COMMON GOOD 103 (John J. Fitz-
gerald trans., 1966). Maritain states:
[T]he principal value of the common work of society is the freedom of ex-
pansion of the person together with all the guarantees which this freedom
implies and the diffusion of good that flows from it. In short, the political
common good is a common good of human persons. And thus it turns out
that, in subordinating oneself to this common work, by the grace of justice
and amity, each one of us is still subordinated to the good of persons, to the
accomplishment of the personal life of others and, at the same time, to the
interior dignity of ones own person.
Id.





sibilities are not mutually exclusive. In helping resolve the conflict for
specific parties, a lawyer also contributes to establishing a precedent or
makes an interpretation that often has an important effect on future cases
and on the contemporaneous legal culture consisting of other lawyers
who consider the virtuous lawyer's work and apply it to their own.
In this day when difficult issues confront the legal process, lawyers are
faced with the challenging task of helping create decisions that resolve
conflicts. The challenge becomes all the greater when lawyers realize that
resolution of so many of these controversies are not clear cut because no
one party has a monopoly on being right or being wrong-but they
should share the common goal of avoiding evil.
By assessing what sort of lawyer the profession needs today, considera-
tion of and appropriation from virtues help a good deal. These considera-
tions may not tell us precisely how a lawyer will contribute to the
resolution of certain cases, nor should it. If outcome prediction is ex-
pected, neither justice, nor the parties, nor our national community will
be well served. If the lawyers who are crucial to the resolution of cases
are not guided by achieving just ends but rather on some predictable
political result, then the goal of justice is compromised. The virtues of
justice, prudence, courage, and wisdom-when found in and practiced by
lawyers-tell us little about how a lawyer will contribute to the determi-
nation of a specific case. On the other hand, they do tell us a good deal
about the kind of person the lawyer is and how we, as members of both
the profession and society, get to the just end for individuals as well as the
public good.
If Dorothy and her companions-and Toto, too-could rely on virtues
to seek and secure their goals, just think of what the members of the
American legal profession could achieve in their quest for justice if they
made the model of the virtuous lawyer the norm for reality.
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